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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Theoretical Framework
Research Question and Thesis Argument
Sectarianism has become almost synonymous with certain Middle Eastern countries.
Since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Sunni and Shia relations have
deteriorated, resulting in massive bloodshed and ‘cleansing.’1 Like their Arab neighbors, Syria
began with peaceful protests in a hopeful Arab Spring. But the once hopeful spring soon turned
into a dark winter and Syria fell into one of the worst civil wars in modern history, displacing six
million people internally and resulting in more than two million refugees. Events which would
have been inconceivable at the start of the millennium are now central to political discussion.
How have we gotten to this point?
This thesis applies a social Constructivist lens to the outbreak of sectarian conflicts in
Iraq and Syria, the two countries in the Middle East which have seen an outbreak of violent civil
wars in the past decade. The dominant explanations for these conflicts reduce the issue down to
identities. This isn’t surprising given the diversity of the two states’ populations. What we aim to
assess in this thesis is how these sectarian identities have been shaped and constructed. I refute
the notion that sectarianism is a natural outcome of competing identities and religious mythsymbols. Instead, I explore the question of how intermestics, or what Bahgat Korany defines as
“the organic relationship between the international and the domestic,” shaped the sectarian
conflicts that broke out in Syria and Iraq.2 The outcome of this research, which will be touched
on in its conclusion, will put forth the common elements which have shaped the Iraqi and Syrian
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sectarian conflicts. Such analyses can be used to better understand the potential dangers of future
sectarian strife in the region. Furthermore, the argument of this thesis highlights the importance
of looking at the complex dynamics of intermestics in international relations.
Two basic concepts dominate the study of these case studies in political science, the
primordialist and modernist arguments.3 The primordialist views the conflicts in Iraq and Syria
as a result of ancient conflicts and competing ethno-symbolism. In this perspective, sectarian
conflicts were inevitable due to the intrinsic differences among the populations in Iraq and
Syria.4 The modernist argues that political identities are imagined and manipulated by the ruling
elites. I find neither argument sufficient in explaining the very complex relationships within Iraq
and Syria. This thesis will argue that the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have been constructed by the
international and domestic communities. Powerful ideas and interests domestically and
internationally have brought forth policies and acts which allowed for the burgeoning of
sectarian identities and conflicts, ones reacting to the dynamics of intermestics.
Due to the complex nature of the topic at hand, specific boundaries need to be made to
maintain clarity and structure. As the research questions relate to how sectarian conflicts are
constructed, my thesis will only assess the situations up until the first outbreak of what most
consider “civil war,” commonly agreed to mean 1000 combat deaths a year combined from each
side.5 In Iraq, our assessment will end in 2006 when sectarian violence ignited. In Syria, this
means an analysis of the situation up until its civil war began sometime in 2011. The thesis will
also draw upon references back to the mandate period. This is due to the fact that many political
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scientists claim that the divisions of the Ottoman Empire into various mandates imagined by the
international community played an instrumental role in shaping the very structure of these
societies and ensured the inevitability of sectarianism in the region.6
Furthermore, this research will be limited to the study of religious sectarianism. This
allows for a more focused analysis, in part due to the predominantly religious tones of the
conflicting sects. Sectarianism as a whole is understood as “a contextualized and historicized
understanding of the concept, rather than an essentialized one, with an emphasis on sectarianism
as being produced – and reproduced – by forces of both a structural and an agential nature; it
utilizes an inclusive understanding of the elements that compromise sectarian dynamics –
accepting communal/religious variables as a starting point (rather than an end point) of analysis
yet recognizing that factionalism that typifies sectarian polities is generated by the complex
interaction of a variety of factional dynamics.”7 In essence, sectarianism is understood as salient
communal identities that create tensions between different communal groups. Since this thesis
focuses only on religious sectarianism, I will not study the issue of ethnic minorities and groups,
including the prominent Kurdish movement in the two states and the region. The Kurdish
question in particular requires its own extensive analysis, which is both beyond the scope of this
paper and has already been done extensively by various scholars. Any analysis of Kurds and
other ethnic groups will be in the context of understanding religious sectarianism as a whole.
This thesis will be organized into four chapters that focus on a specific component of the
argument. In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the research puzzle, explain the
theoretical framework and methodological issues and then situate this research within the overall
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literature on sectarianism. Chapter two will delve into the thesis’s first case study on Iraq. The
influence of the British mandate and its underlying Orientalist preconceptions will lay the
foundation for understanding the modern Iraqi state. I will then dive into an assessment of
intermestics during Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and end with a similar analysis of the
period of the American invasion of Iraq. Chapter three will focus on the Syrian case by similarly
assessing the impact of the French mandate, followed by an assessment of how intermestics
shaped sectarianism during the regimes of Hafiz al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad. Chapter two and
three focus on key events and discourse in order to analyze the intermestic impact and how it
contributed to fueling – or quelling – sectarianism. Chapter four will conclude by highlighting
key patterns of sectarian construction from both case studies by assessing common structural and
agent-level mechanisms that fueled sectarianism in the two states.

Theoretical Framework and Methodological Issues
This thesis derives its theoretical inspiration from social Constructivism. The emphasis of
social Constructivism on identities, intersubjectivity, the power of ideas and the malleable nature
of interests allow for a more critical analysis of the creation of sectarianism in our case studies.
According to the Constructivist corpus, all aspects of international relations are constructed by
actors and are subject to change. As was written by one of the founders of Constructivist thought,
Alexander Wendt:
Social structures include material resources like gold and tanks. In contrast to neorealists
desocialized view of such capabilities, Constructivists argue that material resources only
acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which
they are embedded. For example, 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the
United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the

6

United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared
understandings.8
This last statement is the basic inspiration of this thesis, “amity or enmity is a function of
shared understandings.” In other words, we cannot neglect the importance of social norms and
ideas in shaping politics. We must assess actions and reactions as linked to ideas and interests of
actors to better understand the political scene. Accordingly, we must analyze the way in which
state interactions and the international system as a whole constructed the sectarian identities
within Syria and Iraq.
But one cannot simply claim to be “Constructivist” and not delve further into the meaning
of this term within her or his analysis. The Constructivist corpus is massive, with as much variety
as any other international relations theory. The basics agreed upon by different Constructivists
include the focus on ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in politics, specifically
emphasizing the “intersubjective” nature of ideas.9 There is also a general focus on the
constitutive nature of agents and structures. The earliest Constructivists originally focused on
simply showing that norms, rules and social structures of meaning actually matter in the world of
politics. Katzenstein’s work in The Culture of National Security tackled this basic issue by
analyzing things like weapons taboos, military culture and identity politics and how social
structures more generally construct interests and behaviors that materialize and shape
international relations.10
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9

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001), 393.
10

Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996.
7

With the growth and increased legitimacy of Constructivism, however, different varieties
of Constructivists with competing research agendas burgeoned in the field of IR. I now attempt
to place myself within this massive field of differences within the Constructivist school. One of
the larger debates of the paradigm lies in its assumptions. Modern and postmodern variants of
Constructivism, as named by Price & Reus-Smit, split Constructivist thinkers. According to
Martha Finnemore and Kathyrn Sikkink, the difference can be understood by the following:
Postmodernist Constructivists reject efforts to find a point from which to assess the
validity of analytical and ethical knowledge claims. This stance makes it possible to
deconstruct and critique the knowledge claims of others but makes it difficult to construct
and evaluate new knowledge claims. For modern Constructivists, on the other hand,
acceptance that the world is always interpreted does not imply that all interpretations or
explanations are equal; some types of explanation and evidence are more persuasive or
logically and empirically plausible than others.11
Between these two areas, this thesis is situated in the modern approach; more specifically
it is aligned with one of the founders of Constructivism, Alexander Wendt. Wendt and
Katzenstein helped pioneer the field of identity research within Constructivism.12 The weight of
international issues, however, is different for the two authors. Finnemore and Sikkink’s analysis
of Katzenstein and Wendt lead them to claim that while Katzenstein focuses primarily on the
importance of domestic influence on identity formation, Wendt emphasizes the international and
systemic impact. While Wendt does emphasize the importance of systemic factors, my own
reading of Wendt has interpreted greater balance within his theoretical framework in terms of the
weight of the agent as opposed to the social structure.
A Wendt-Inspired Constructivist Approach

11
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The following will aim to briefly highlight the important aspects of Wendt’s theory that
will be applied in this thesis. It should be noted that I do not aim to put forth a comprehensive
description or analysis of his theory, as that is beyond the scope of this text. Instead, I aim to
highlight the most essential terms and components of his theory which will be most relevant in
the analysis put forth in this thesis. Following Wendt’s own chronology in his classic book
Social Theory of International Politics will also give us more structure in the process.
First, Wendt places an emphasis on the state system project, which he supports by
elaborating on the central role played by the state. Despite the important role of other actors, he
posits that states “are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the
regulation of violence are channeled into the world system.”13 He elaborates that non-state
actors may be “becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change
ultimately happens through states.” States are thus the central actor in the system, according to
Wendt.
This thesis has a similar bias, focusing predominantly on states and state-actors instead of
other units. Other actors, like intergovernmental organizations for example, are mentioned within
the analysis. However, I use such intergovernmental organizations, like the League of Nations, to
better understand the international system as a whole, instead of assessing them as actors within
the international arena.
Wendt also differentiates between ideational and materialist theories and rightly places
Constructivism within the ideational realm. In this way, Constructivism’s overall project
revolves around the structure of social consciousness or ideas.14 He emphasizes that “It does not
13

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999: 7.
14

Ibid., 24-25.
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mean that power and interest are unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend
on actors’ ideas.” This point is central to the argument and analysis of this thesis, since
sectarianism is an idea, though it does have material foundations and outcomes, as will be seen
later in the paper.
The holistic dimension of Constructivism is also elaborated upon. What does a holistic
approach entail? Unlike one-dimensional approaches, holistic theories do not focus mainly on
individual agents and interactions. One must delve into a deeper analysis which is not simply
causal and focused on behavioral effects only. One must look at the property effects. For
example, a Constructivist analysis can assess how interactions actually impact the system or
actors’ identity, not only behavioral changes.15 Wendt’s moderate approach is once again
highlighted when he takes both behavioral and property effects into consideration. Wendt
stresses that “the structure of the international system exerts both kinds of effects on state
identities. These may be less than the effects of domestic structures, and certainly a complete
theory of state identity would have a substantial domestic component.”
Wendt continues throughout his book to elaborate on the importance of such unit-level
interaction analysis, that of interactions between states which have behavioral effects. The unitlevel analysis is needed prior to delving deeper into the property effects of the full structure. To
elaborate further on these important concepts, he states: “The one [causal] describes a change in
the state of Y as a result of a change in the state of an independently existing X. The other
[constitutive] describes how the properties of an X make a Y what it is… The causal and

15

Ibid., 26-27.
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constitutive effects of culture on agents can be exerted on just their behavior, on their properties
(identities and interests), or on both.”16
In terms of the structure-agent debate, Wendt makes it clear that both are central to
Constructivism. “It is important that IR do both [agent and system] kinds of theorizing.”17 It is
not enough for Wendt to focus on one or the other. Purely looking at interactions of agents – i.e.
states – would be reductionist. Unit interaction-level analysis is considered micro-structural and
the systemic approach is defined as macro-structural.18 Both types of analysis are important to
Wendt. My analysis will be biased towards micro-level interactions in earlier chapters but will
aim to delve deeper into a macro-structural analysis in the concluding chapters. Another
important highlight of Wendt’s theory lies in his definition of the social system:
The structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions,
interests, and ideas… [They are] distinct and play different roles in explanation. The
significance of material conditions is constituted in part by interest, but they are not the
same thing…. Similarly, interests are constituted in part by ideas, but they are not the
same thing… without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no
meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all….
The task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system
fit together into some kind of whole.”19
Herein is the basis of this thesis. I expand most on the ideological component of the state
identities of Iraq and Syria and how domestic, international, micro and macro structures have
constituted the current state of affairs. To do this, Wendt’s three elements are assessed – material
conditions, interests and at the heart of all of these, ideas. As Wendt so accurately points out,
“people act toward objects, including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have

16
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Ibid., 11.
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Ibid., 150.

19

Ibid., 139.
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for them.”20 Wendt narrows down this notion of “ideas” to knowledge – or a belief that is taken
to be true by actors. Even this concept of knowledge is complex. Knowledge is a set of
“interlocking beliefs” which is subjective and intersubjective at the same time. The system in
which these beliefs exist automatically has a constitutive effect.
To clarify the above, Wendt gives the poignant example of two identical states that
believe themselves to be the “hegemon,” thus identifying themselves as stabilizing forces in the
system. In the scenario in which the dominant state is legitimate within the system, it is
empowered by others and thus can act on its self-identity. It is also constituted as the “stabilizer”
and the “hegemon” by itself and the system. In the other case, the dominant state isn’t
empowered by others, thus other states will negatively perceive actions to balance the system,
which will impact actions and reactions. In that scenario, the state is not actually a hegemon as
this identity is limited to its own beliefs. In Wendt’s own words, contrary to the Finnemore and
Sikkink analysis, his approach to culture gives “equal weight to agency and structure.”21
In addition to Wendt’s theoretical framework, this thesis is also partially inspired by the
theoretical work of Iver Neumann in “Self and Other in International Relations,” which explored
the role of identity in shaping international relations.22 Neumann claims that, contrary to popular
belief, eliminating the “Other” is not the purpose of politics. Instead, Neumann claims that the
purpose of politics is creating and maintaining this other. This basic idea about the “other” and
the “self” will appear often throughout the paper.

20

Ibid.
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Ibid., 184.
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Iver Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations
2:2 (1996): 139-174.
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Through Constructivism and its elements, which have been elaborated upon, one cannot
take sectarianism for granted. To claim that it was inevitable for sectarianism to erupt due to
competing interests of religious groups, for example, would be reductionist. One must look
further and assess how interests and identities were and are continually constituted.
Applying Intermestics and Other Methodological Issues
The works mentioned above focus on the construction of international relations – or
relations between two or more states. This thesis expands on their work by bringing in
intermestics to operationalize this critical social Constructivist lens. According to Bahgat
Korany, intermestics is defined as the following:
It is a reflection of creeping globalization, characterized by the retreat of exclusive state
sovereignty, and the rise instead of the intensity of societal interconnectedness and
speedy circulation of ideas, but without wiping out the impact of local features.23
Our aim is to understand how sectarianism within Iraq and Syria respectfully has been
impacted by the organic connectedness of local and global influences, as the identities within the
nations have been shaped by both factors. To ignore one or the other would, once again, lead to
reductionism. Given Wendt’s emphasis on the importance of domestic factors and the clear focus
of intermestics on both domestic and international variables, I expand on Wendt’s understanding
of micro-structural level analysis by adding domestic factors in this area. While Wendt uses this
term to define interaction-level analysis between states, we will view micro-level analysis as
both between states and within one state (domestic). Macro-structural analysis will sustain its
purely international systemic approach.

23

Bahgat Korany, “The Middle East Since the Cold War,” in International Relations of the Middle East,
ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 81.
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Through a historical analysis which relies on both secondary and primary data, this thesis
will explore the construction of identities, ideas and structures in Iraq and Syria which led to
sectarian conflict. Materials used include secondary research from books and journals along with
an exploration of memoires, interviews, state records, speeches, statements, news articles and
survey data. Using this information, I will expand on the application of a Wendt-inspired
Constructivism to the realm of intermestics, allowing for a more complete understanding of how
sectarianism was constructed in Iraq and Syria.
The historical perspective of this thesis is worth a brief discussion. In International
Relations, political scientists have predominantly focused on the current political moment with a
hint of forward-looking analysis, to varying degrees of success. This thesis looks back on a
period of approximately one-hundred years of intermestic occurrences and applies a
Constructivist IR analysis. Why did I choose to have a longer historic perspective? In order to
understand the states of Iraq and Syria and an issue as complex as sectarianism, one is obliged to
look at a longer period of time, especially given that those who espouse sectarian sentiments
contextualize themselves within a historic sense of victimhood.24 Furthermore, early sectarian
policies have materialized changes in the position of power of certain groups over others, as will
be seen with the impact of the French mandate on Alawi domination in Syria.25 We must assess
different sectarian moments to see how intermestics have played into the construction of such
sectarian identities. Given the real impact of history in shaping such identities, the only way to
understand the issue is by going back in time to the original construction of the state itself and
the politics that have influenced identity formation.
24

John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, Jose Ramon Sanchez and Caroleen Marji Sayej, The Iraq Papers.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 313-314.
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Situating the Thesis within the Research
The literature in political science analyzing sectarianism is split between two camps. One
perspective emphasizes the intrinsic conflicts between different groups derived from competing
symbols and ancient conflicts. This is known as the primordialist argument.26 On the other side is
the modernist perspective, which focuses on imagined political identities which are then
manipulated by the ruling elite.27
The primordialist argument is quite simple to understand and that is perhaps why it has
been the dominant explanation used by the general public and media. A look at the Sykes-Picot
agreement could indicate that the issue lies with the way mandates were segmented, without
taking into consideration the various ethnicities within. In this perspective, the story is simple. In
the twentieth century, just before the end of World War I, the British and French divided the
Ottoman Empire into French and British mandates.28 The agreement, with its simple straight
lines dividing the region, made no real effort to understand the tribal and religious diversity
within the newly created mandates. As a result of this agreement, Syria, at the time of the
outbreak of civil war in 2011, became a state with the following diverse population: 64 % Sunni
Arabs, 9% Christians, 3% Druze, 1% Shia, 10% Kurds and Alawis.29 In Iraq, according to Pew
Research in 2011, 51 percent of the population identifies themselves as Shia Muslims and 42 %
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identifies as Sunni.30 This primordialist perspective thus claims that due to ancient hatred and
competing ideologies, it was inevitable for sectarianism to run amok in 2011 Syria during the
Arab Spring and in 2006 Iraq without the control of Saddam Hussein. This is a popular belief,
one that even some world leaders hold to. According to U.S. President Barack Obama in a 2013
statement on Syria, “In that part of the world, there are ancient sectarian differences.”31
Fanar Haddad makes a more sophisticated argument for the primordialist perspective.32
Haddad claims that modern political identities in Iraq are based on ancient ethnic ties bound to
certain myth-symbols. Those myth-symbols are dormant and ready to be reawakened in future
crisis. This is a bottom-up perspective, unlike the modernist views as will be seen shortly.
In line with this perspective, Naser Ghobadzdeh and Shahram Akbarzadeh argue that
“other”ing is intrinsic to Islamic thought. According to the authors, Islam uses “other”ing to
justify itself, presenting a binary world of “core true believers” surrounded by disbelief.33 This
othering has thus evoked sectarian beliefs that ignited into violence against Shias in the Muslim
world. Similarly, the authors claim that Shia Muslims also use “othering” against Sunnis, as
exemplified by revolutionary Iran which depicted the Sunni governments as tyrannical and
illegitimate.
For the Islamists this is a battle between good and evil – a Manichean perspective which
opens the door to the evocation of the concept of jihad to defeat evil. Holy war is the
jihadists’ answer to the above challenge, which presents the good vs evil (Islam vs Kufr)
duel as a matter of existential urgency. While not all Islamists are jihadists, jihadism
30

Michael Lipka, “The Sunni-Shia divide: Where they live, what they believe and how they view each
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draws on the Islamist world-view and is sustained by practices and traditions of othering
in Islamic scholarship.34
While the authors of the above focus on the construction of “other”ing, there is an
assumption that this is an intrinsic part of Islam, and thus the argument becomes a mix of
primordialist and Constructivist. The authors claim that the construction of the “other” is a
natural part of Islam, its history and its myth symbols. This assumption leads to the logical
conclusion that there can be no reconciliation among different religious groups in Muslimdominant countries.
On the other side of the spectrum are modernists who claim that political identities are
imagined and manipulated by ruling elites. Different scholars have focused on varying aspects of
the creation of sectarianism. Research agendas in the past have usually focused on politics from
above and have been able to come up with a variety of intriguing studies.
According to Christopher Phillips, for example, Syria has been the subject of
manipulation by the Ottomans and French as well as Syrian politicians in the 50s and 60s and the
Assads after them.35 Phillips argues that sectarian propaganda was also used by the Muslim
Brotherhood, through the use of anti-Alawi writings of Ibn Taymieh. In the Bashar al-Assad era,
Alawi elites were favored and Sunnis marginalized in the interest of the ruling elites. Such
modernists thus view sectarianism from the top-down, whereby ruling elites have the control,
unlike the primordialists.
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Another author, Benjamin White focused most of his energies on the analysis of the
Syrian mandate period.36 White’s research is an intriguing Constructivist analysis of the concepts
of majority and minority in Syria. He does not focus on sectarianism explicitly but is instead
interested in the constitution of identities within this dichotomy of minority and majority and
how the mandate period brought these terms into popular coinage among both elites and the
general population.
There is a plethora of other writings currently available for those interested in researching
sectarianism in Iraq and Syria. Many research projects have delved into the impact of the
mandate periods on Syria and Iraq. Others have focused on a single issue like White’s research
into the construction of minorities. Phillips, for example, focused on to what degree the conflict
in Syria can be characterized as sectarian. It is agreed in most of the literature that there is an
element of religious sectarianism to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. This thesis is not interested in
proving this point specifically, but instead will look at the elements of sectarianism historically
in both cases in order to analyze how sectarianism has been constructed.
This thesis aims to create an analysis that is as unbiased as possible towards either only
top-down or bottom-up perspectives. The primordialist approach is viewed as bottom-up while
the modernist approach focuses on the top-down. Such analyses deny the dynamism of politics
and bind actors, interests and ideas to a single vertical motion. The use of diaries, journals and
eyewitness reports through the Constructivist perspective will allow for a more dynamic analysis
than either the traditional primordialist or modernist perspective can attain since it is not bound
by these limited views. Actors, interests and ideas are seen as dynamic and bound to act and
react to each other and thus are not bound to any single vertical motion.
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This thesis thus aims to do two things. First, it aims to bring forth a Constructivist
analysis of information available on Iraq and Syria. It will assess secondary sources through the
prism of Wendt’s Constructivist approach, and it will count on primary sources, including
speeches, diaries, journals, eyewitness reports, literature and newspaper articles which include
first-hand accounts of events. This thesis is unique in its historic perspective on both cases and
its approach in analyzing sectarianism in Iraq and Syria in order to form both a case-study
Constructivist analysis of each state’s sectarian character and also assess the common agent and
structure elements in both. Through an assessment explicitly using Wendt’s approach, this thesis
will bring forth additional insights about the construction of sectarianism in Iraq and Syria.
It is important to have both a case-study component as well as a synthesis of the two
cases. The case studies will allow for a deeper assessment of the particular elements of each
state. Ignoring the individual components would lead to too much generalization that could be
misunderstood. Still, identifying the key similar patterns of the cases will allow us to identify
some of the more generalizable points in the construction of sectarianism that could potentially
be used for future research.

Chapter 2 – Constructing Sectarianism in Iraq
Introduction
The Shia-Sunni divide in Iraq is one that has been constantly conveyed in media and in
research. The first question one must ask is, are sectarian identities salient? The second question
is: if they are prominent among the population, are they expressed in opposition to one another in
a way that would lead to sectarian violence? According to Pew Research in 2011, 14 percent of
Iraqi Sunnis said that they do not consider Shias to be Muslim; in contrast, only 1 percent of
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Iraqi Shias made the same claim that their Sunni countrymen are not Muslim.37 While these may
seem like small percentages, one can interpret this viewpoint as the more radical perspective, as
it completely ostracizes the other group as outside of the Muslim tradition, which, as will be
seen, is central to Iraqi identity. It is also significant in that it shows greater animosity on the side
of the Sunnis than the Shias, which will be understood through the analysis in this chapter.
Another Pew Research finding is able to paint a more complete picture. In a survey of
thirty-nine predominantly Muslim countries in 2011 and 2012, research noted that a significant
share of Muslims globally don’t see a distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam and thus view
themselves in a non-sectarian manner by affiliating as “just a Muslim.” On the other hand, in
Iraq only 5 percent answered “just a Muslim” and more than ninety-percent of respondents
categorized themselves in one of the affiliated groups.38 This is significant because it shows a
salient sense of affiliation with a particular sect of Islam. However, these numbers alone cannot
portray the complex identity conflicts at play in Iraq. One must delve deeper.
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries in Iraq are intriguing for the study of
Constructivism and intermestics for a variety of reasons. The country’s history is deeply complex
with the intermingling of international and domestic influences, both of which have resulted in
concrete effects that can be seen throughout its history. Other cases may give way to interesting
analyses based on international diplomatic ties or international pressures, but Iraq has seen its
fair share of direct international interventions, whether during its early years as a nascent state
under the British mandate or its recent experience as an occupied territory under the United
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States of America. And, of course, it has experienced the ramifications of changes in neighboring
countries and the globe. This history has entrenched intermestics in the country, with both
domestic and international influences shaping Iraq’s identity and the internal relations of its
peoples.
Before delving into our analysis, we first briefly revisit some of the main principles of
Constructivism. Wendt can shed light on some of the main principles that will be used to assess
intermestics in our case. According to Wendt, “Identities and such collective cognitions do not
exist apart from each other; they are ‘mutually constitutive.’”39 He also goes on to claim, “It is
through reciprocal interaction… that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social
structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests.” These interactions are thus
integral to our analyses. We will assess the interactions between states and within them to see
how sectarian religious identities have become such an integral part of the Iraqi narrative and
identity, sectarian identities which continue to plague the nation during its current civil war. We
begin by assessing the period of the British mandate in Iraq, followed by an analysis of the
Baathist regime and ending with the impact of the American invasion in Iraq.

The British Mandate: Orientalist Thought & the Early Construction of Iraqi Identity
Many have claimed that Iraq’s current chaotic state is a simple result of the fact that the
nature of the “state” and Iraq’s borders were created through a Western lens. One can take a look
at the Sykes-Picot agreement and interpret that the issue lies with the way mandates were
segmented, without taking into consideration the various ethnicities within the boundaries. Just
before the end of the First World War, the British and French segmented the Ottoman Empire
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and took control of territories under their respective mandates.40 The agreement’s overly
simplistic straight lines dividing the region gave no heed or consideration for the tribal and
religious diversity within the newly created mandates. Referencing back to the Pew Research of
2011, 51 percent of the Iraqi population identifies as Shia Muslims and 42 % identify as Sunni,
in addition to a number of other minorities such as the Kurds and Assyrians.41
It is not sufficient to chalk up sectarianism to diversity, as there are countless success
stories for quite diverse states. As Wendt notes, “it is through reciprocal interaction” that social
constructs are created and reinforced.42 What reciprocal interactions have shaped Iraqi
sectarianism? We first turn to the powerful British ideas about Iraqi society in the early twentieth
century and how these notions led to concrete constructs in terms of social institutions and
actions which irreversibly impacted the population.
The League of Nations handed Great Britain the mandate of Iraq after World War I in
1920, with at least the superficial appearance that the ‘mandate’ was a step away from the former
model of European domination in the form of colonial conquest.43 Britain’s inherited ideas about
Iraqi society influenced the policies enacted in the nascent state; policies which helped define
Iraq’s early identity.
Britain’s acting commissioners throughout the beginning of the early twentieth century
give insight into British perception of Iraqi society. As Acting Civil Commissioner in Iraq from
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1918 to 1920, A.T. Wilson put no trust in the Iraqi people to rule their own country. 44 Under his
time as commissioner, he largely ignored Iraqi sentiment in the new state. According to Wilson,
Great Britain must not be “diverted by a handful of amateur politicians in Baghdad.” After tribal
uprisings overcame the mandate in 1920, Percy Cox replaced Wilson and took the mantle of
High Commissioner in Iraq.
Orientalist Ideas Re-Constitute Identities around Tribe & Religious Divisions
British commissioners came to power with preconceived notions of the former Ottoman
Empire and the Orient in general. Toby Dodge describes the Orientalist lens through which
British personnel viewed the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Their understanding of Iraqi
society was based on the “popular imaginative constructions influential in British and wider
European society from the eighteenth century onwards.”45 This meant that these ideas played a
key role in how the British mandate operated by influencing the types of interests Britain had
which thus materialized into policies on the ground. With the negative stereotypes of the
Ottoman Turks in mind, the new personnel considered the urban class educated under the
Ottoman Empire “tainted by training and working within corrupt institutions.” This powerful
idea about the inept Ottoman-corrupted class needed an “other” to which it could be juxtaposed.
Rural Arab tribes, who were seen as “true” Iraqis that remained unadulterated by the vile nature
of the Turkish enemy, filled this “other” role. As Dodge states:
With the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War, British propaganda had
begun to use Orientalist tropes to portray “the Turk” as degenerate, slavish and brutal. As
the war progressed, strategic thinking and public imagination focused on the role of the
Arab revolt and hence on the non-Turkish populations within the Ottoman Empire. This
conscious and subconscious separation of Ottoman and Arab became more accentuated
44

Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 14-15.

45

Ibid., 43.
23

with the birth of the mandate ideal in 1919 The Arab populations of the Ottoman Empire
were now allies of the victorious powers. Free from Turkish oppression, they were
worthy candidates for states of their own, capable of benefiting from European tutelage.46
The discourse around the urbanites clearly shows the negative perceptions and onedimensional constructs created by the British due to Orientalism. Commissioner Cox called the
urban elite “impecunious and backward,” whereas a British Political Officer in Najaf called for
the isolation of the “half-fledged intelligence of Baghdad” who would adulterate the rest of
society.47 With these notions in mind, the British turned their eyes to the tribes – or the
romanticized version of the tribal system which the British helped bring to life.
Such images were powerful and continued to influence British perception of Iraqis whose
progression during the Ottoman era was completely ignored. In Four Centuries of Modern Iraq,
written in 1925, Longrigg claims that Iraq passed through four hundred years of stagnant
Ottoman rule.48As he put it, the country had experienced “almost no progress” either in “mind
and spirit, or of material wealth and modern method.” Longrigg posits that Iraq at the turn of the
twentieth century may be a “little less wild and ignorant, as unfitted for self-government, and not
less corrupt.”
Furthermore, not only did the British project constructs of popular Ottoman Orientalist
sentiments onto Iraq, but they also falsely projected their own society’s experience onto the Iraqi
one. In an attempt to organize society, Britain placed a single unifying tribe above others in
different regions.49 Through the new British policy, tribal leadership would pass down through
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familial ties, from father to son or brother to brother. This was a direct reflection of the British
monarchical system and had no foundation in the organic relations of tribes in Iraq. In fact, the
process for the bequeathal of Iraqi tribal leadership had once been based on consensus, with
tribes collectively selecting a leader who was deemed most qualified. Such policies and the
allowance of privileges to certain tribes to tax and lord over others led to animosities that grew
into the revolt of 1920. As Dodge states, “the British projected simplistic but powerful notions of
their own historic past on to the rural population of Iraq.”50
The consequence of these British perceptions was a concrete construction of Iraqi
society, which directed society towards rural divisions instead of paving a pathway for the urban
class to build a more modern state. The British put power into the hands of the tribes, through the
tribal sheikhs, who would be used as intermediaries between the people and the state. 51 The
sheikhs became the rural aristocracy and the educated urban class was completely stripped of
power. All of these real changes arose from powerful Orientalist ideas.
The emphasis on the tribal system can be seen through the efforts of the British to
categorize and order society according to tribal lineage. Tribes were chronicled and details were
put together at length in relation to the origins of each tribe, the larger group from which it came,
and the degree of tribal “purity,” which was measured by how directly leaders were descendent
from early tribal founders.52 British records from the period show long, elaborate lists detailing
information about various tribes across Iraq. Headlines include the number of men within tribes,
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number of rifles and number of towers controlled.53 The only individuals explicitly named in
these lists were the key sheikhs from each tribe, who were heavily investigated to better
understand their personality and lineage. The clear emphasis on these individual personalities
and Britain’s negligence of the rest of society shows the importance placed on tribal leaders’
shoulders. A report on the land revenue in the region of Kirkuk in 1919 summarizes the
centrality of the tribe in the British mandate of Iraq:
Political freedom cannot be attained except through a community. We must therefore
look for some simple form of responsible community on which to base our system. The
simplest form of community in the purely Kurdish area is the tribe or the section of tribe:
elsewhere the village.54
Often, written accounts by British personnel during the mandate make reference to the
tribal nature of Iraqi society, with A.T. Wilson describing the “unsophisticated” Arab, Kurd, or
Persian with their deep loyalty to family and tribe. Thus, it became policy to only consider the
tribal sheikh when considering policy issues. As Gertrude Bell states, the “rank and file of the
tribesmen, shepherds, marsh dwellers, rice, barley, and date cultivators of the Euphrates and
Tigris, whose experience of statecraft was confined to speculations, as to the performances of
their next-door neighbors” would hardly be useful in advising the nascent state.55
The unstable nature of this formalized tribal system, in which the sheikh soon became the
ultimate source of power and authority over whole areas, becomes quite clear by looking at just
one example of the failure of its authority. Ali Sulaiman, who ruled the Dulaim on the upper
Euphrates, was seen by the British as an instrumental force of authority. 56 In 1922, Yetts, a
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divisional adviser, had placed his greatest hopes in Sulaiman’s ability to wield authority over the
region: “if a place can be found in the body politic for the type which Sheikh Ali Sulaiman
represents with their rights clearly defined the whole-hearted support of this class can be counted
on.” But despite this enthusiastic vote of confidence, Sulaiman failed in his role and it became
apparent that the power placed upon the sheikhs was shallower than expected. While several
sectional leaders had recognized Sulaiman as their supreme sheikh, as the British desired, in an
attempt to avoid British retribution for their part in the 1920 rebellion, this show of support came
without real foundations. In 1924, Sulaiman was unable to collect revenues from the people and
needed to call the British to help him fulfill his duty. As it turned out, perhaps the sheikh’s power
and influence were not as strong as the British imagined.
Some of the points mentioned above are useful in understanding that the British did not
base their perceptions of Iraqi society on an objective perception of reality. The British formed
their own constructs that in many ways altered Iraqi society. Giving power to tribal leaders in
geographically divided territory inevitably brings political power struggles in this arena. The
salience of the tribal identity, when it is the main identifying marker used in government, would
thus be higher in such a society. Instead of being organized by wealth, education, or other
identifiers, the tribal root is activated as the main identifier. Not only did the British bring greater
salience to tribal identity but they also fed into Shia-Sunni tensions.
Empowering the Minority: Disenfranchising the Shia & Constructing the Shia “Other”
Dodge affirms that religious divisions were a very important category for British
personnel during the time of the Iraq mandate. According to Sir Henry Dobbs:
The Jews and the Christians . . . are the most progressive of the inhabitants of the
country. Although they number only about 7 percent of the population, the proportion of
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wealth in their hands must be very much greater. They are much more interested in the
development of the country.57
A prominent element of the Orientalist perspective that dominated British thought is thus
the concept of the backwardness of Islam. Longrigg states that “no Islamic state in modern times
had reached the first rank of nations.”58 The effect of Islam meant that “in the very air and aspect
of the East there seems to lie an acquiescence, a lack of the forward impulse.” Just like with the
tribes, the British categorized groups based on religious affiliation. While Islam as a whole was
viewed negatively, Shia Islam seemed “more Islamic than Sunni Islam,” according to Dodge’s
analysis.59 The British, weary of the Shias, gave preferential treatment to Sunnis and Sunni
tribes.
Just as will be seen in later years in Iraqi history, the Shia were categorized under British
rule as “alien” – Persians who had no real or authentic connection to Iraq. The Shia ulama,
intellectuals, or Mujtahids were looked at with suspicion under British rule. Gertrude Bell, an
influential administrator and advisor in the creation of the British mandated Iraq, seems highly
skeptical of them and repeatedly references Shia clerics as “alien popes,” “exercising real
temporal authority . . . and obstructing the Government at every turn.”60 The Mujtahids were a
hindrance to Iraq’s development due to their backward nature. The rebellion of 1920 was blamed
fully on the Shias – and their foreign nature. British intelligence reports between 1920 and 1927
focused on the alleged role of the Shia Mujtahids in inflaming the violent rebellion amongst the
Shia tribes along the Euphrates. The British used these suspicions to justify consolidating power
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and authority with Sunnis. It thus appears that the British, whether knowingly or unintentionally,
were fueling sectarianism by dividing societal power and placing Sunnis above their Shia
counterparts, more specifically Sunni tribes over Shia ones.
It may be useful in this analysis to go back to some primary texts written by those who
supported in the administration and creation of the new Iraqi state. We can take a brief look at
the published letters of Gertrude Bell, the previously mentioned administrator and advisor in the
creation of the British mandated Iraq. Her words are quite revealing of the attitude of the British
– as well as, in some cases, the Iraqis – in the formation of the state. Specifically, we will assess
her discourse on the Shia-Sunni relations and on how the British went about forming the new
state when it came to religion.
In her letters, Bell frequently mentioned the animosity between Sunnis and Shias, and
points to the hostility of the Shias towards the new mandate. Bell states that “the Naqib’s
Council has against it almost the whole body of Shias, first because it’s looked upon as of British
parentage, but also because it contains considerably less Shias than Sunnis.”61 She then goes on
to highlight an important aspect of British attitude, which influenced the formation of the new
government. “The Shias, as I’ve often observed, are one of the greatest problems.” As Dodge
noted, Shias are often mixed with Persians, with no distinction made between the two. In a letter
by Sir Henry Dobbs, he also notes the threat of the Shias in the following:
The frontiers having thus been strengthened and the Turkish menace for the time staved
off, the field was free to deal with the agitation of reactionary Shia divines against the
elections for the Constituent Assembly. By July 1923, their demeanour towards King
Faisal and towards the Iraq government had become intolerably arrogant, and King Faisal
saw no other way than to authorize the deportation of their leaders, Sheikh Mahdi al
Khalisi… [This] was followed by the voluntary exodus to Persia of several other
prominent Persian divines as a public protest.62
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In the above, it is clear that no distinction is made between the Shia and the Persians.
Dobbs begins by noting the threat of the “Shia divines” and then makes reference to the exodus
of the “Persian divines.” One can only assume that he uses the two interchangeably. Bell
continues with this similar identification of the Shia as Persian when she explains the lack of
representation of Shia in the acting Government. In one letter, Bell recalls the memory of an
Iraqi asking her why a certain cleric wasn’t included in the government. In this recollection, she
responded by highlighting the Persian descent of the individual cleric in question and thus his
inability to serve on the Iraqi cabinet.63 In her words: “their [i.e. the Shia’s] leading people [are]
the learned vines and their families are all Persian subjects.”
To assess whether or not these Shias were truly of Persian origin or if their allegiance lay
with Persia is beyond the scope of this thesis, and to a great degree, it is irrelevant to this analysis
whether or not this link was fact or fiction. What matters is that there seems to be an intentional
exclusion of the Shia people by the British mandate. These Shia within Iraq, regardless of their
origin, had been placed under the new Iraqi borders by the mandate and the Sykes-Picot
agreement. Thus, they were – and are – constituents of the Iraqi state. As Bell notes, they were –
and remain – the majority of the state. The purposeful exclusion of this large group would
inevitably lead to animosity based on sectarian religious divides as this is the identifying trait by
which they were excluded from participating in the nascent state.
Yet, despite these clear indications that the exclusion of Shia from power was a
purposeful exercise by the British, the blame for sectarian division is later placed on the Sunnis
in power. Whether true or false, it seems that the British imagination of the contentious Orient is
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quite strong, even if their leaders show the same bias. In a letter written on January 22nd, 1921,
Bell writes:
I hear rumours that the Sunnis of Bagdad are considering whether it wouldn’t suit their
book best to have a Turkish prince as King. They are afraid of being swamped by the
Shias, against whom a Turk might be a better bulwark than a son of the Sharif. The
present Government which is predominantly Sunni, isn’t [sic] doing anything to
conciliate the Shias. They are considering a number of administrative appointments for
the provinces; almost all the names they put are Sunnis, even for the wholly [sic] Shia
province on the Euphrates, with the exception of Karbala and Nejd where even they
haven’t [sic] the face to propose Sunnis…If they want popular native institutions, the
Shias, who are in a large majority, must take their share.64
This sentiment is at odds with Bell’s previous observation when she labeled Shias “one of
the greatest problems.”65 The paternalistic tone is prevalent in the selected passage as well as
others, with Bell appearing to offer sage advice to the Iraqis who were unable to rule fairly
among their diverse population. Regardless of the attempts by the British, it is clear that it was
not only the Shia who were opposed to the mandate and the way in which it ruled, despite
attempts to categorize discontent as purely a Shia problem. As Bell herself states “It’s true that
few are pleased, but they wouldn’t have been pleased with any line whatever.”66
It is important to note that none of the above analysis claims that the constructs present
during this time period were created by the British or during the British mandate. It would indeed
be an oversimplification and factually inaccurate to exclusively blame the British for the
sectarian conflicts that have paralyzed the country in recent years. During the Ottoman Empire,
Sunni Iraqis were similarly favored over their Shia brethren, as there was also the same
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contentious fear of the Shia’s potential connection to Persia. However, the British imagination
did make its impact during the early years of the Iraqi state.
Given the power and ability to create a new state, the British chose to strengthen tribal
and sectarian identities. This has been highlighted by the explicit statements from Gertrude Bell
and Stephen Longrigg, both of whom have negative perceptions of the Shia. The British brought
forth a tribal system of organization, instead of supporting the already established educated
middle class. Out of fear of the Ottoman influence and their belief in the Ottoman’s
backwardness, the tribal sheikh policy emerged. Furthermore, Sunni tribes were favored over
Shia ones, even in predominantly Shia-majority areas. This gave Sunni Iraqis power over Shia
Iraqis and built the foundation of the sectarian history that has allowed for the development of
Shia Iraqi sense of victimhood. As the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim Al-Haeri would state
almost a century after the mandate in 2002, “The rights of the Shia have been violated for a long
time and up to our period today… as a result of tyrannical governments.” 67 As early as the Iraqi
state’s inception in the 1920’s, the Iraqi Shia can point to a sectarian policy enacted by the state
against them in favor of their Sunni counterparts. These nurtured feelings of sectarian
victimhood would only be further aggravated throughout the decades, specifically in the period
of the 1990s and after the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.
This section aimed to give a brief look at and assessment of the early roots of
sectarianism in the Iraqi state. The British mandate in Iraq and the attitude of the colonizers has
been analyzed to focus on the possible signs of early sectarianism that were emphasized during
the early twentieth century. While many eventful years followed, we now fast forward decades
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later to the 1990s when sectarianism burgeoned as a result of intermestic interactions which are
vital to the understanding of Shia-Sunni relations in recent years.

The Baath in Power: Minority Domination & Intermestics Reinforce Sectarianism
We must not submerge ourselves in the theoretical pan-Arab and neglect the direct, local
patriotic (al-watani). . . . We must speak of the Iraqi who comes from Sulaymaniyya [i.e.,
a Kurd] and he who comes from Basra [i.e., a Shia], without pointing to his ethnic
origins. . . . Let us delete the words Arabs and Kurds and replace them with the term the
Iraqi people.68
The speaker of these reconciliatory words was none other than Saddam Hussein, the then
Vice President, in a speech given in 1975 to Iraq’s teachers. This approach was generally sought
by Saddam in his early years and up until the 1990s.69 In the beginning, the regime spent lavishly
on supporting artists and poets, commissioning new festivals, building new museums and
renovating older ones. Generally, the regime pursued a policy that celebrated Iraqi history as far
back as not only the early Islamic era but also the Babylonians and Assyrians. According to
Saddam in his early years, his Baathist vision for Iraq was not theocratic. He stated: “Our party is
not neutral between atheism and faith. It is always on the side of faith, but it is not a religious
party. . . . What we must do is to oppose the institutionalization of religion in the state and in
society. . . . Let us return to the roots of our religion—but not bring it into politics.”70
However, such liberal and unifying policies were ephemeral. Domestic and international
interactions led Saddam to pursue a new method, one that unrepentantly and explicitly harbored
sectarian sentiments. Jerry Long states that from 1968 to 1977, the regime had no religious
overtones. However, from 1977 to 1989 this began to change with more Islamic themes in the
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official state discourse. From 1989 and onward, Long described the period as one of “deliberate
Islamic flag waving.”71
This is not to say that the Shia-Sunni issue had been resolved prior to 1989. Briefly, we
can return to the prior period and point to how sectarianism continued after the Iraqi mandate.
During the days of the monarchy, there was a famous saying that permeated the Shia community.
“The taxes are on the Shia, death is on the Shia, and the posts are for the Sunnis.”72 This clearly
shows a sense of victimhood that continued throughout the twentieth century. After the
monarchy fell, top posts still remained for Sunnis who held approximately eighty percent of the
highest positions, with Shias only making up sixteen percent, despite their majority in the
country. Even during the Baathist early years, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was
made up of fourteen Arab Sunnis and one Kurd – with no Shia representation. By the 1980s, two
Shias were part of the seven-person council. Saddam favored his own family members and the
Tikritis tribe over others – most of whom were Sunni. The Islamic Call party, formed in 1957,
was led by an Iraqi Shia who felt disenfranchised from politics and continued to remain active
throughout the following decades.73
Yet, despite many clashes and the arrest and execution of Shias from such parties
throughout the 1970s and 80s, the government attempted to co-opt Shias through its policies. The
Baathist government gave cash gifts to Shia communities and worked to improve infrastructure
in Shia-majority areas, including the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.74 From 1974 until 1982,
the government spent more than 100 million dollars in Karbala, a predominantly Shia area. In
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general, things were looking up for the Shias who saw real improvements in their communities.
The party aimed to not only improve the social development of the southern regime which was
heavily Shia, but it also opened up new opportunities for Shias to participate in government. By
1990, before the tides would turn once again, Shia held nearly the same portion of Baathist posts
as their Sunni counterparts.75 Furthermore, they made up approximately twenty percent of the
general posts in the Iraqi army and were heading approximately half of the state-owned
enterprises. These improvements were, of course, aimed to sustain Saddam’s power and portray
the Baathist party in a benevolent light. As long as the Shia did not present a threat to the ruling
party, there was no reason for their total disenfranchisement.
Two elements shifted the discourse and policies towards the Shia: the Iranian
Revolutionary threat and the 1991 revolt. The Iranian Revolution presented an ideological threat
to Saddam’s rule. Khomeinism was an ideology that, like Baathism, presented itself as total, able
to encompass society and government.76 Its appeal to Iraqi Shia was a very real threat that
Saddam faced. The secular nature of the Baathist party, which may have once been part of its
appeal, now seemed to be a potential weakness. After the invasion of Iran by Iraq, Khomeini put
the conflict in religious terms: “You are fighting to protect Islam, and [Saddam] is fighting to
destroy Islam.” As a result of Iran’s assaults in religious terms, the Baathist regime began its
transformation. The war with Iran became a jihad and Saddam was named a mujahid. Islamic
terms became more common and the recitation of the Quran became a regular occurrence in the
media.77 The two sides constituted the conflict along religious lines. All of this was in fact, not
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outwardly sectarian in nature. This was an attempt to ensure the support and loyalty of Shias in
Iraq, whom Saddam and the party feared would find the Iranian Islamic principles appealing. It
didn’t take long for the regime to switch tactics again when the revolt of 1991 threatened
Baathist power. The increased prevalence of Islamic terms and Islamic references meant a
greater salience of religious identities. Even before the outright oppression of the Shia, such
religious rhetoric became more central to Iraqi discourse and thought.
The 1991 Revolt & Its Sectarian Legacy
In 1991, as the Iraqi soldiers retreated from Kuwait in defeat, there was a sense of
resentment towards the party as the nation felt the sharp sting of national humiliation.78 The
international community had condemned the invasion and the weakness of the state seemed
palpable. Days before the uprising, on Voice of America radio President George H.W. Bush
encouraged Iraqis to “take matters in their own hands” and bring Saddam Hussein’s regime to an
end.79
The exact details of the rebellion are not necessary for our purposes. It is enough to say
that rebels attacked government institutions, intense fighting spread and important Shia holy sites
were vandalized.80 Perhaps because of the war’s proximity to the southern region which was
predominantly Shia, the rebellion took on a sectarian tone. Protesters lifted images of turbaned
men, including Khomeini’s portrait. By March, all nine of the Shia-dominant governorates were
in an uproar. The apparent sectarian nature of the rebellion dissuaded Sunnis from joining. A
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Human Watch Report paints a dark picture of the events that followed.81 Thousands of Kurds
and Shia were either executed or seized by the regime, according to the report which depicted
disturbing details.
In the remote marshes along the southern border with Iran, thousands of Shia who fled
during the uprising lack adequate food, hygiene and medical care and are at risk of Iraqi
military operations in the area. Their numbers include active rebels, army deserters and
displaced persons afraid to go home. Little is known with certainty about the numbers or
magnitude of the military operations… [the] displaced population in the marshes has
been virtually ignored by the world community.82
Henceforth, the regime’s slogan became “There will be no Shia after today.” 83 On March
16, Saddam claimed that the rebellions were part of a larger foreign plot and specifically linked
the rebellion to neighboring Iran.84 As James Baker noted, “The Iraqi Shia were quite naturally
perceived as being aligned with Iran.” Shia clerics were put under house arrest and religious
shrines were destroyed.85
It is important here to note that the construction of Shia Iraqis as part of an Iranian
conspiracy, a threatening “other,” came from the top and below. While one could simply put the
responsibility of constructing the Shia “other” on the regime itself, this is overly simplistic and
denies the people the power to constitute their own identities as well as the identity of the state.
Narratives of the event point to the fact that the protests began by both Sunni and Shia Iraqis
initially, but when the demonstrations took on more explicit “Shia” tones with the pictures of
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Khomeini, among other signs, this discouraged the involvement of Sunnis.86 This narrative
shows that the people themselves also viewed the Shia with suspicion, as they refused to be
involved in what they perceived might constitute a Shia uprising. Had there not been a sense of
sectarian identity, the Sunnis could have very well demonstrated along with the Shia, regardless
of the images displayed. Instead, we see that the state and the people constituted the situation
along sectarian lines. The Shias displayed “Shia” images – like Khomeini – and thus framed their
plight around an explicitly Shia identity. Sunnis perceived the Shia framing as dangerous and
thus did not join the demonstrations. The regime played the Sunnis against the Shia and
instigated a sectarian attack on Shias. All of these factors led to sectarian tensions. Furthermore,
not only did the consequences of the rebellion fuel sectarianism, but the outcome of the 1990’s
sanctions by the United Nations pushed sectarianism to new heights.
UN Sanctions Fuel Sectarian Strife
The unprecedented severity and length of the UN sanctions enacted in 1990 along with
the decades of war that plagued Iraq prior to the late twentieth century crippled Iraq and set in
motion shifts in the social fabric of its society.87 According to the United Nations’ Economic and
Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), real GDP per capita declined by 72 percent
between 1990 and 1992 and again plummeted by 51 percent between 1992 and 1996. As
incomes fell, food insecurity rose and overall health declined. The paternalistic state which had
once been central to national economy and employment withdrew from its role in an attempt to
focus on an equitable food rations programme. Iraq successfully averted famine but overall
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nutrition levels and health saw a steep decline. In 1999, a UNICEF report documented a 75%
reduction in Iraq’s GDP, doubled child mortality rate, increased malnutrition and mental
illness.88 Citizens suddenly found the state inept and unable to provide services and support that
people had grown accustomed to; the days of the state’s prominent role from birth to death was a
thing of the past. While the state had previously employed nearly forty percent of the workforce,
it could no longer afford to sustain such policies.89 Middle class state workers’ salaries decreased
by nearly 80 percent from1991 to 1996. The state took a step back from its paternalistic role and
it subjects were left to find a new way to function in a deprived society in which social
development was clearly crumbling.90 Where did the Iraqi people have to turn?
Echoing back to the British mandate period, the role of the tribe was revived as a result of
the harsh reality that the state would no longer be able to support its citizens. Prior to the
nineties, the tribe had been viewed as something backward for the latter half of the twentieth
century.91 The Baath party found tribes to be a hindrance to social progress and reform. This is
clear from the state’s attempt at decreasing the salience of tribal identities. In 1976, the party
forbade tribal titles from being used. Perhaps this was to hide the fact that the party itself had a
clearly tribal bias, with most of its members from the Tikrtis tribe. As Hanna Batatu says, “[The
Tikrtis] role continues to be so critical that it would not be going too far to say that the Tikritis
rule through the Ba’ath party, rather than the Ba’ath party through the Tikritis.”92 Regardless of
the reason for the shift, the party’s policies were not encouraging of such tribal identities.
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However, with the realization that the party could no longer offer social solutions as it once had,
policies shifted to support tribal allegiances. The state more explicitly dealt with tribes. Tribal
recruitment became standard and glaringly apparent, especially in the area of security. Tribes
were used to fill the vacuum of the state and became celebrated for their productive role in
society. Once again, as in the time of the British, the shaikh became the focal point of contact
between state personnel and the people, especially in the south and the countryside. The state
even sponsored tribal shows of support, to further bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of the people
and the illegitimacy of the uprisings in 1991. Saddam went so far as to say that the party had
been mistaken in “inciting the people against feudalism.” And according to Saddam, the Baath
was “the tribe encompassing all tribes.” It became official policy that progression in state
positions was based on familial and tribal roots. For the first time since the seventies, tribal titles
and backgrounds of party members were published in the nineties. Tribal justice became
permissible by law and the regime went about coopting tribal leaders to join its ranks.
Furthermore, the state embraced Sunni tribes while only a few Shia ones enjoyed new
government support. Regardless, Shia tribes were marginalized, especially those in the south.93
The 1991 rebellion had put a mark on the southern tribes, which were heavily Shia. Fanar
Haddad claims that perhaps it was regionalism that actually led to this imbalance, with the tribes
from Western Iraq and Tikrit as those closest to the regime and the others falling behind.
However, considering the state’s explicit aggression towards Shias, it would be difficult to
assume that religion didn’t have a role to play. As one tribal leader from the Babel governorate
claims:
All the water is with them. Here we have a drought, there’s barely any water for our
lands; but go to Tharthar [lake in north western Iraq] and the water is bursting….. I was
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once in a gathering of sheikhs from the western region – Tikritis and all sorts. One of
them – in my presence mind you – reprimanded another: ‘we hear that you gave your
daughter [in marriage] to someone from Qurna [near Basra].’ The man assured everyone
– and am there with them – that the groom was a good man and from a good family. Then
he was asked: ‘next thing you’ll be giving your daughters to Najafis!’ to which he
replied, ‘I would sooner give her to a dog from Tikrit.94
Such regionalism and tribalism no doubt had sectarian undertones which supported
reinforcing feelings of victimhood, especially given the other acts by the state. Islam became an
official part of the discourse, specifically with the “Faith Campaign” launched in 1994. 95 This
encouraged stricter adherence to Islamic principles, including the encouragement of women to
wear the veil. The regime banned alcohol from all public spaces in the same year. Ancient
Islamic punishments including amputation became legal. The person to mosque ratio rose
substantially from 1:37,000 in the 1950s to 1:3,500 in the 1990s. The most critical aspect of
these Faith Campaigns to our analysis is the Sunni beliefs from which they were derived. The
official discourse began to outright condemn the Shia, including in a series of articles in the AlThawra Daily newspaper. Pointing to the Shia rituals of Ashura, which had been banned since
1977, the below expert explicitly questions Shia traditions.
When we criticize in order to evaluate an aspect of our errors… we will not be driven to
self-flagellation or self harm like the self harm and lashing of bodies and selves in Ashura
in the manner exported to us by foreigners. We thank God that we repudiated this before
now and we hope to repudiate other alien norms and adoptions which are harmful.96
Intermestics Reinforce Sectarian Divides
The preceding details were necessary before delving into a deeper analysis of how
intermestics worked to support the construction of sectarianism. The events described fully
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portray the complexity of the relationship between international and domestic elements in
changing the dynamics of a society and bringing greater salience to sectarian tensions. The
uprising of 1991 is analytically intriguing because it shows how sectarian tensions in Iraq in
1991 were impacted by not only the domestic but the international situation.
The 1991 uprising came in the midst of a greater systemic battle for the identity of the
region after the Iranian Revolution. Regimes across the region took measures to quell domestic
dissent.97 The Iranian Revolution presented a threat to status-quo regimes in the Middle East,
who feared similar events within their own borders. Had there not been such an imminent threat
perceived at the time, perhaps the reaction would not have been so quick to target Shias
specifically and forge policies that fueled sectarian sentiments.
The humiliation Iraqis felt could further be echoed in the international arena, as the UN
condemned the invasion of Kuwait. Iraqis felt that humiliation as the soldiers came home from
the battlefield, distraught and having failed the mission which they had been promised would
bring glory. Iraqis were encouraged to revolt by both international and domestic forces –
explicitly by President George H.W. Bush. The nature of the uprisings was further manipulated
by the Saddam regime to make it appear less attractive to Sunni citizens. By shedding light on
the religious tones of the rebellion, Saddam ensured the isolation of the movement and brought
greater salience to the religious aspect. From then on, his policies further agitated Shia
sentiments of victimhood since they were at the center of the regime’s attacks and their fellow
Sunnis had greater privileges post-1991.
International pressure from the United Nations sanctions agitated domestic occurrences
even further. While the Iraqi economy had been suffering, and surely would have suffered
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further due to its failed invasion of Kuwait, the literature is in consensus about the severity of the
sanctions on the social fabric of Iraqi society. Annihilating the state’s ability to fulfill its role in
supporting the people through its services forced the state to rely on the tribal system to take up
its mantle.98 Consequently, this brought greater salience to sectarian identities, since the tribal
system has clear religious divisions as well. Not only was there a heighted sense of religious
identity due to the divisive rhetoric of the regime but society was now organized around
sectarian lines.

The American Invasion: Re-Constituting Iraqi Identity from the Outside
In every age there have been people who considered that an individual had one overriding
affiliation so much important in every circumstance to all others that it might legitimately
be called his ‘identity.’ For some it was the nation, for others, religion or class. But one
only has to look at the various conflicts being fought out all over the world today to
realize that no one allegiance has absolute supremacy. When people feel their faith is
threatened, it is their religious affiliation that seems to reflect their whole identity. But if
their mother tongue or their ethnic group is in danger, then they will fight ferociously
against their own co-religionists.99
The above passage by Lebanese writer Amin Maalouf is pertinent to our Constructivist
analysis of Iraqi sectarian conflict. Earlier periods assessed, including the British mandate and
the Baathist regime in the late twentieth century, are foundational to the proceeding discussion.
Without the understanding of previous instances that fueled religious conflict, one cannot
understand the eruption of tensions in our modern period. No singular event created such
divisions. The complex interplay in both the international and domestic arena, which was
supported by certain perceptions from different players, essentially constructed our current
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moment. There was no inevitability in the violence we have recently seen in Iraq. It was the
power and fear of ideas (such as Khomeinism) and the emphasis of identity politics that led to
what the world continues to witness today. The following section aims to assess the role of the
U.S. invasion and American policies as well as Iraqi actions and reactions in fueling sectarianism
in Iraq in the twenty-first century.
In 2002, just a year before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, exiled Shias abroad came together to
write a manifesto based on what they perceived as the unique Shia experience which had been
built by decades – if not centuries – of resentment. The group called for a new Iraq based on
democracy, federalism and the respect of the human rights of all citizens. “The Iraqi Shia
problem is now a globally recognized fault line and is no longer restricted to the confines of
Iraq’s territory,” the Declaration of the Shia of Iraq begins.100 Very clearly they claim that,
“Iraq’s political crisis had nothing to do with either social discrimination or a latent Shia sense of
inferiority towards the Sunnis, or vice versa. It is entirely due to the conduct of an overtly
sectarian authority determined to pursue a policy of discrimination solely for its own interests of
control.” The declaration dismissed the idea of Iraqi Shia creating their own state separate from
Sunnis, but it advocated for a federal system that would be fair to all sects within society. Other
exiled Iraqis came to support the declaration. What would come of these ideas after the Baathist
regime fell?
On October 16, 2003, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UNSC
Resolution 1511, effectively bringing about the US mandate of Iraq.101 Thus came yet another
opportunity to reshape Iraqi political society from the outside. The British had already had their
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chance. The Iraqis had formed several governments, including that of Saddam’s most recent
Baathist party. The potential for Iraqi society to fall apart completely was high. Two National
Intelligence Council classified reports for President Bush indicated that an invasion of Iraq
would likely mount support for political Islamic parties and further the sectarian divide in Iraqi
society.102What would the Americans do? How would they impact Iraqi history?
As time has already shown, the impact of U.S. influence has been no more successful in
ameliorating sectarian divides. While the sectarian legacy of history shares part of the
responsibility for the events that have transpired during the new millennium, the impact of U.S.
policy cannot be underestimated. The new government formed by the U.S. further enforced
previous divisions and played an instrumental role in exacerbating sectarian tensions, resulting in
a bloody civil war and general unrest in Iraqi society.
Creating an Inept Council Divided by Sectarian Ties
The U.S. attempted to form yet another governing system in 2003, one which shares
many similarities to previous ones analyzed. The plan from the start aimed to create an Iraqi
Interim Authority which would be comprised of Iraqi nationals who would administer the
country under the authority of the occupying forces.103 Through an ambiguous process, U.S.
Chief Administrator to Iraq Paul Bremer established a new Iraqi governing council. Bremer set
up a quota system that would be used to select council members. Based on the ratio of communal
identities, it was determined that the council would be made up of thirteen Shia Arabs, five Sunni
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Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkoman and one Christian.104 Leadership of the council was set up to
rotate between members, but any power they were given remained under the Coalition
Provisional Authority of the US and Great Britain.105
The council lacked democratic legitimacy and essentially divided Iraqi society based on
ethnicity and religion. The occupying forces chose the council in a non-transparent process and
gave Iraqis no voice in the new system, a system which had promised to bring about democracy.
Iraqi national and Professor Wisal al-Azzawi, Dean of the College of Political Sciences of
Nehrein University, points to one of the deep flaws behind the council.
Why didn’t they ask our opinion? ‘What role has been given to scientists, technocrats,
intellectuals, businessmen, unions? Because of the way it was secretly appointed, the
Council appears very much an American creation imposed on the Iraqi people… The
democratic process does not happen in a day or two, and should not be connected to a
handful of people who collaborated with the occupation.106
Not only did the new system bolster domestic pre-existing sectarian identities but it
added a new element to the conflict – a division between exiled Iraqis, mainly Shia, and those
who had remained in the country. The parallel cannot be overlooked. Similar to the British who
had chosen to give power to tribal systems, as they were afraid of the educated class that had
been nurtured under Ottoman rule, the U.S. chose to empower Iraqi exiles, more specifically
Shia Iraqis who had been disenfranchised during the Saddam years, rather than risk placing
potential Saddam-sympathizers to the helm of power.
The system appears to have been set up for failure from the start – or without much
concern for its success. According to an interview with a political science professor who had
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been part of the government formation process, members chosen in the council were selected
based on their support of the occupation.107 Furthermore, according to this source, the long
political process for choosing these members was actually simply designed to see who would be
the most supportive of US policies in Iraq. Thus, sectarian identity and loyalty to U.S. occupying
forces became the main criterion for choosing the new leaders of the country. This same
anonymous source also revealed other sordid details. Bremer personally dismissed the
importance of the Council, viewing them as insignificant parts of the political scene. The
interview with the same source notes that members of the Council feared Bremer’s power over
them, as he could easily dismiss any contentious debate by pointing to the illegitimacy of the
council itself since it wasn’t chosen through any democratic or representative process.
Interviews with Iraqis reveal that in the public perception, Bremer is essentially recreating the oppressive conditions that existed under Saddam: unilateral decisions to
isolate Iraqis, reneging on promises, parades and heavy security, twisted truths about
improving living conditions, insensitivity to the daily suffering of the people, the
disappearance of Iraqi civilians and press censorship.108
There seemed to be no effort by the new international occupier to create a cohesive
society, and the blunders of the Americans only served to reignite sectarian strife through
policies and actions which brought even greater salience to sectarian identity. The Coalition
Provisional Authority de-Baathification program succeeded in pushing the Sunnis to the margins
of society. Since the Sunnis occupied a disproportionate majority of Baathist state bureaucratic
and security positions, they felt the greatest impact of the government overhaul which cleansed
out former state employees. According to estimates, anywhere from 30,000 to 120,000 Iraqis
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were left jobless due to de-Baathification.109 The U.S. even disbanded the Iraqi army, putting
400,000 trained young solider out of work with scant job options.110 This large group of skilled
soldiers provided a strong base for the sectarian militias that later formed. These changes not
only built resentment towards the occupying forces and the new system but they also gave
Sunnis reason to be suspicious of the cooperating Shias.
“Othering” Shia Iraqis - from Persian Snake to Western Agent
The discourse of Sunni insurgent groups can shed light on the sentiment of Iraqi Sunnis
about the U.S. occupation and the cooperative Shias. A 2004 interview with a Jaish Muhammad
spokesperson by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting reveals the new Sunni Iraqi
perception of the indistinguishable character of the Shia in power and the occupying forces.
When asked about the group’s position on the Iraqi Governing Council, most of whom were
Shia, the spokesman stated:
Our position is clear – they are all spies, traitors, and agents for the Americans. First, they
do not represent the people of Iraq because they are not elected. They are appointed by
their masters, the Americans. Second, the appointed Governing Council members were
[in exile during the Saddam regime]. They do not understand Iraqis suffering and Arab
traditions. [They] were distorted by the Western life they lived.111
This reveals an interesting new development in the “othering” of the Shia. Since many
members of the new government had been exiles, the Sunnis perceived them as “westernized.”
Thus, while at one historical moment the condemnatory characteristic of the Shia “otherness”
was in connection to Persia, the new means of ostracizing the group and further segregating the
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identities of the Shias and Sunnis now became the link between the Shia and the Western
occupier. To be Shia became synonymous with traitor by association.
This new condemning connection between the Shia and occupiers had real implications.
The armed insurgency initially began by targeting foreign troops, but soon turned towards Shia
targets as well. Sunni extremist groups, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq, began
to attack Shias that supported the Americans.112 According to al-Zarqawi, “[The Shia are] the
insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy
and the penetrating venom.”113
These revived tensions were clearly a consequence of complex intermestic dynamics that
had taken shape over years and decades. Shias, who had been marginalized and persecuted
during the Saddam era and even previously, found their fortunes had finally changed for the
better. The Americans were willing to empower them – even if it was partially a ruse and under
the occupying authority. On the other hand, the Sunnis, who had grown accustomed to privileges
under the Baathist regime, were feeling the bitter sting of the shifting tides, as they saw their role
in society diminish and their security vanish. The “other” to the Sunni Iraqi had transformed
from the suspicious “Persian Shia” to the enemy “Westernized Shia” who was willing to
cooperate with the powers that had stripped the Sunnis of their previous privileges.
These patterns of “othering” continued throughout the next several years until the
eruption of the Iraqi civil war. Violent sectarian attacks went back and forth between Sunnis and
Shias, with the United States switching sides later in the conflict. After the 2005 parliamentary
elections made the sectarian divide even clearer – with a generally strongly religious body
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dominated by Shias – the U.S. became hesitate of its Shia-empowerment strategy. Instead of
continuing its support of the Shia, the occupiers reached out to Sunnis to take junior roles in the
new state and toned down their full support of Shias, targeting Shia militias and taking back
some of the powers that the group had gained after the occupation.114The U.S. had effectively
supported the radicalization of Sunni militants, helped the Shia take power and Iraq had become
a breeding ground of jihadists and a magnet for extremist Islamic groups. As one report
summarizes:
The U.S. occupation of Iraq further deepened sectarian tensions. As the U.S. searched for
Iraqi political collaborators to establish a pro-occupation government, it marginalized the
secular political forces, seen as too nationalist, in favor of more compliant religious
parties and groupings.... The U.S. promoted (and the mass media accepted) an
ethnic/religious conception of Iraqi politics that did not acknowledge the long supremacy
of secular nationalism and did not reflect the complex ethnic mix and the diversity of
many Iraqi cities and regions, such as Mosul, Basrah and especially multi-ethnic
Baghdad.115

Conclusion
The sectarianism that ignited in Iraq in 2007 cannot be explained or understood by an
isolated event or occurrence. The complex interplay of intermestics in the Iraqi arena throughout
the course of history resulted in the civil war that continues to threaten the country and region
today. Iraqi society had already been deeply divided prior to the U.S. invasion. We can see this
from the disproportionate representation of Sunnis in power during the Baathist regime. The
active engagement of sectarian discourse by Saddam Hussein against the Shias only further
fueled divisions. The ostentatious repression of the Shia population after the 1991 rebellion and
the sectarian slogans that the regime raised all helped create a tension that was on the verge of
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ignition. While these components are mainly domestic, one cannot ignore the important role
played by the existential threat of the Iranian Revolution, which gave the Iraqi regime much to
fear. Prior to the modern period, the foundation of sectarian society had already been instilled
through Orientalist policies enacted under the British, who had divided society along sectarian
lines and favored Sunni tribes over Shia counterparts.
The American invasion and its consequential influence on Iraqi society threw the match
that lit the final flame. There is no doubt that dividing the new governing council by communal
identities and no other apparent qualifications helped bring greater salience to sectarian
identities. Perhaps it was the American perception of the sectarian nature of Iraqi society that led
to such a system. The de-Baathification of Iraq predominantly impacted Sunnis who suddenly
found themselves at the fringes of society, without work or access to power. Finally, disbanding
the Iraqi Army left hundreds of thousands of trained and disenfranchised men without any reason
to support the new regime. The history of Shia-Sunni tensions, which has been described and
analyzed at length at least from the period of the British mandate, gave a solid foundation for the
conflict between the two groups. Sunnis had a history of fearing “the lurking snake” that was
symbolized by the Shia, who had once been accused of harboring loyalty to Iran and who now
became representative of another enemy that threatened and disturbed their Sunni brothers – the
Americans.116

Chapter 3 – Constructing Sectarianism in Syria
Introduction
a citizen afraid to pray –
What if the State Police stake out the prayer line?
They might say I tried to contact the Merciful on High
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Worse, they might accuse me
of perpetrating faith
- God, what a place117
The above was written by the prolific Syrian writer Nizar Kabbani in 1984. Religion is
invoked in fear. “A citizen afraid to pray,” he writes. The narrator worries that he will be accused
of “perpetrating faith,” as though faith is a crime to be punished. Of which faith does he speak?
The author alludes to a reality within his society in Syria, two short years after a massacre by
state security in the predominantly Sunni city of Hama. Kabbani wrote this poignant poem
describing the fear of the state and revealing the salience of sectarian tensions nearly three
decades prior to the Syrian civil war in 2011. The construction of sectarian identities and
divisions must thus be traced further back to understand its roots.
This chapter aims to assess the construction of sectarianism in Syria through a historic
analysis of three periods. The chapter begins with an assessment of the French Mandate in Syria
in the early twentieth century, as this is the period which first brought forth the idea of the Syrian
state and made it a reality. Given the tumultuous nature of the period of coups before the Baathist
regime successfully established itself, this period is skipped over. Instead, this thesis goes
through an analysis of the state under Hafiz al-Assad, followed by an assessment of the regime
under his son in the new millennium. The aim of this historic analysis will be to analyze the key
components that led to the construction of Syria as a sectarian state by looking at the underlying
agent and system roots.
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After the fall of the so-called ‘Sick man of Europe,’ it was the British who first supported
the creation of a new state in the area now demarcated as Syria. 118 With the support of the
British, between 1918 and 1920, the Hashemite Amir Faysal ruled over an Arab government in
Damascus. Though his control was limited, his supporters claimed sovereignty over geographic
Syria and in March 1920 proclaimed him King of Syria. By July 1920, the French had
successfully kicked out Faysal from Damascus and established their own rule in the various areas
that would later become Syria, all with the legitimacy of the mandate under the newlyestablished League of Nations. The French ruled over a fragmented land, with separate states in
Damascus and Aleppo as well as autonomous rule for the Druze and Alawi. Damascus and
Aleppo would eventually merge in January 1925 and the Alawi and Druze areas would remain
separate until 1936.
The French inherited a diverse land in the Levant in general and in the soon-to-be Syrian
lands specifically. In 2011, the composition of Syria was incredibly diverse religiously and
marginally diverse ethnically. The estimated population composition by 2011 was: 64 percent
Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Kurds, another 10 percent Alawi, 9 percent Christians, 3 percent Druze
and 1 percent Shia.119 The Alawi minority is of particular interest to this thesis, as this small
minority would play an important role in Syria’s modern history. Though the religious identity of
the Alawi has been contested, since the 1920s at the time of the mandate they have continued to
constitute their religious identity as part of Shia Islam, meaning they are part of the religious
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minorities of Syria.120 During the mandate period, the French would have to navigate this diverse
environment, which also included ethnic minorities like the Armenians and the Circassians.
Orientalist Ideas Re-Constitute Identities around Religious Divisions
It is well-documented throughout the literature that French officials adopted divisive
communitarian politics, politics based on religious sectarian identities.121 According to Benjamin
White’s elaborate study on the concept of minorities during the mandate period, the very
concepts of “minority” and “majority” gained coinage and value during French mandated Syria.
Such ideas are powerful constructs that give salience to sectarian identities, especially given the
fact that the terms emerged around religious notions.
According to White, French officials strengthened the former millet system of the
Ottoman Empire and actually further built the millet system’s divisive nature. 122 Through the
millet system, the Ottomans categorized different non-Muslim groups according to religion Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians, Jews, etc. The millet system gave each
community political autonomy and handed authority to either the patriarch, as in the case with
the Christian denominations, or the chief rabbi, in the case of the Jewish communities.
Like the British during their reign over the Iraqi mandate, due to the dominant Orientalist
discourse the French perceived the Ottoman system as static and thus interpreted the millet
system as completely divisive, with little to no interaction between the different groups within it.
According to the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Beirut, who was also in charge
of the Syrian areas, “each community is a little people, jealous of its personality, which has its
120
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chief, national and religion at the same time; they are so many nations, and in effect they carry
that name.”123 This powerful idea re-constituted the system and thus the identities within Syria
into a more divisive society than had been the case under Ottoman rule.
The French thus segregated Syrian areas and people by religious segments. The French
Personal Status Law legally created “Syrians” for the first time, and religious identity became the
central element that would determine the policies and laws that applied to certain groups.124
Similarly, the census categorized people by religion.125 Unprecedented administrative actions
divided society along religious lines. The French distributed seats to representative bodies on
religious communal grounds and gave legal autonomy in matters of personal status to
communities which had not been autonomous prior to the mandate. Article 6 of the mandate
charter further reinforced this emphasis on religious affiliation. The article stated that “Respect
for the personal status of the various peoples and their religious interests shall be fully
granted.”126 Furthermore, the French granted territorial autonomy to certain religiously defined
groups. According to White, the Ottoman Empire had actually begun diminishing the legal
distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims under the millet system since the mid-nineteenth
century, though they retained the personal status law in general. Thus, the powerful Orientalist
French ideas pushed forth policies based on a reality that no longer existed. According to Syrian
expert Eyal Zisser:
Indeed, immediately after taking control of the entire Levant in 1920, the French acted to
fragment the area…The French intention was to ensure their future control over this
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territory, once it had fallen into their hands. Even when they set up the Syrian state at the
end of the 1920s, they hampered the establishment and operation of its governmental
institutions. Rather they continued to strengthen and entrench the forces of disunity and
divisiveness in Syrian society, including sectarian and regional rivalries and the gulf
between the urban and rural populations. The legacy of French Mandatory rule would
later prove a handicap for the post-independence Syrian regime.127
France’s divisive policy allowed for the burgeoning of several autonomous regions which
would later be incorporated into the Syrian state. Small state-lets were created in the Latakia
region, with its Alawi majority, and the Jabal al-Druze with its Druze majority.128 While the
Ottomans had let these areas rule autonomously informally, partially due to their remote
locations, the mandate formally gave these groups independence. Under High Commissioner
Damien de Martel, a religious decree was issued on 13 March 1936 which further embedded
religious divisions into law.129 Communities – defined by the Personal Status Law by religion –
would be required to submit to their own communal laws, which would be based on their
religious texts and traditions. Sunnis rose up in opposition to such a policy at the time but they
were only successful in delaying the enactment of the law, which the French pushed forth
regardless of popular opinion. While the Ottoman Empire recognized no distinct sects among
Muslims, the French expanded the millet system by including different Muslim groups as distinct
groups, including the Druze and Alawis. The French enforced this new frame on even the
smallest of populations, like the Isma’ilis who had no official religious authority to consult.
The deliberate construction of the new Syrian society around religious lines was quite
apparent by France’s refusal to acknowledge ethnolinguistic minorities, regardless of their push
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for communal rights.130 Kurdish and Circassian demands and pleas would continue to be ignored
during the French mandate. Circassians requested recognition of political rights as a minority in
1928 and were refused by the French. The High Commissioner claimed:
Under the name ‘communities’ are generally designated groupings of individuals of the
same religion and the same rite… This definition of communities evidently excludes any
other groups whose individuals are united by links other than confessional links
(community of religion and of rite). The Tcherkess [Circassians] are of Sunni Muslim
religion and cannot, from the confessional point of view, form a distinct community.
Empowering the Minority: Disenfranchising the Sunnis & the Fear of Nationalism
Since the Sunni Muslims were perceived as the most ‘nationalistic,’ the French feared the
threat they could present if the law recognized the group’s communal rights. Kurds, who are also
predominantly Sunni Muslims, presented a similar problem to the French mandate. France thus
focused its efforts on minorities who were perceived as harmless and supportive of French rule
and also as an application of the principle of “divide and rule.”
A combination of factors also led to a clear religious bias in the Syrian army during the
mandate period. The French recruited predominantly from outside of the central capital, which
meant a disproportionate amount of minorities joined the military.131 The result of such policies
led to an over-representation of the Alawi and Druze, who only made up approximately 13
percent of the population at the time.132 By 1944, the Alawis were clearly over-represented
among soldiers, though they still had poor representation in the officer corps and within
politics.133
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Economic and political factors also reinforced this recruitment strategy. Wealthy Sunni
Arab landowners and businessmen – who were the main leaders of the Arab nationalist
movement – refused to send their children to military training. Not only did nationalism play a
role in their disengagement with the army, but society perceived military service as a low-class
career.134 On the other hand, the army attracted those who hoped to move up the social ladder,
those like the marginalized religious minorities from rural regions. The Alawi and Druze were
among the minorities who flocked to join the army, with the enthusiastic encouragement of the
French. Furthermore, after recruiting these mainly minority soldiers into the mandate’s army, the
men were used as part of special forces to suppress rebellions, which were predominantly led by
Arab Sunnis.135 Given these factors, it is not surprising to see the clear frustration of the majority
Sunni population. According to one High Commissioner:
The Muslim community in general complains of having lost, since the occupation, and
without compensation, the major part of its privileges. Above all it complains of being
subjected to a regime of exception, which places it in a state of manifest inferiority vis-àvis the other communities.136
Silencing Visions of Unity
The previous international politics-from-above events can be contrasted with the
domestic sentiment within Syria, which paints a different picture of the Syria that the people
imagined and hoped to constitute. In an editorial written during the early years of the mandate, a
Christian newspaper editor, Yusuf al-‘ssa, proposed the Prophet’s birthday as a national holiday
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to rally ‘all the Arabophone communities.”137 According to al-‘ssa, “our country contains only
one, Arab, stock.”
Alawi scholar Abd al-Rahman al-Khayr also played a central role in combatting the
divisive constructs of the French.138 Al-Khayr brought the Alawi into the Shia identity, as they
had previously been pushed to the peripheries and not recognized as Muslims by most scholars
and Sunni Muslims. In 1937, Al-Khayr wrote:
The Nusayris, as they were once called, and the Alawis as they are called now in the
period of the [French] occupation, are one of the Muslim sects … They are imamate
Muslims and pure Arabs. For many reasons—mainly the pressure of some tyrannical
rulers in the Islamic period—they took refuge in the mountains of this country.
Perhaps what is most interesting about this drive is the importance of the Alawi “genuine
Muslim” concept. Al-Khayr brought forth a renewed and more Shia-orthodox ideology into the
Alawi doctrine and continued to advocate for Alawis to be considered “genuine Muslims” until
he died in 1986. Why would the originality of the religion be of central importance to scholars if
the identity of “Muslim” wasn’t central to the identity of the Syrian? The existence of this
argument among scholars shows that there was a strong conception of Alawi exceptionalism –
their “otherness.” If this were undisputed, if sentiment of Alawis inclusivity into the general
communal (Syrian) identity were real then there would be no need for such elaboration and
decades of work. In order to be accepted as part of the general Syrian identity, an Islamic
heritage seemed to be a central element, even according to Christians like al-‘ssa. Thus, there
needed to be an acceptance of the Alawis as part of the overall Muslim identity of the country,
and it was central to the Alawis to be perceived within and outside of the community as
“imamate Muslims and pure Arabs.”
137

Ibid., 52.

138

Farouk-Alli, “Sectarianism in Alawi Syria: Exploring the Paradoxes of Politics and Religion,” 216.
59

Yusuf al-‘ssa’s editorial also aimed to unify the divisive identity that was being
constituted by French policies and discourse. By pushing for the prophet’s birthday as a unifying
symbolic day, al-‘ssa also pushed forth the inclusion of the Christian community into a common
identity with others. Additionally, High Commissioner Damien de Martel’s claim in a New York
Times interview that France was in Syria to protect the country’s Christian minorities led to
protests among Christian nationalists in Aleppo.139
On the other hand, in treaty negotiations in 1936, a plea was sent by Alawi and Christian
members of the representative council stating that “the populations of this government belong to
different Communities, each one having its beliefs, traditions and distinct customs. Relative to
Syria as a whole, they constitute minorities that cannot and do not wish to be incorporated into
Syrian Unity in any way.”140
Understanding National Identity and the Concept of Minorities
These complex matters point to a central issue from the beginning of the creation of the
Syrian state – national identity. The state system originally put forth by the Treaty of Westphalia
in 1648, which had only applied to Europeans, was pushed onto non-European groups in the
early twentieth century.141 American President Woodrow Wilson’s project to universalize the
sovereign state beyond European powers brought forth with it the mandate-system, which aimed
to eventually create states. Arguments for a unified Syrian state, like those of al-‘ssa and others,
reinforced the state system by giving it priority. Those for Syrian unification supported in
constituting Wilson’s state-system vision. Those opposed to unification that sought their own
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small state sovereignty, like parts of the Alawi community, who negotiated for their
independence in 1936, also legitimized the state-system by reinforcing its validity and claiming
the importance of their own sovereignty.
After the formation of the League of Nations, the nation-state became the only
internationally legitimate form of independent state.142 This legitimacy within the international
community was granted only by the League. The mandate charter encouraged the divisive
politics pursued by the French. In Article 1 of the mandate charter, it required that the mandatory
state – France in this case – to privilege local autonomies. Article 6 guaranteed the personal
status and religious interests of peoples, which has already been assessed. According to White,
during the early mandate period, there was no constituted identity of “minority” because it was
not yet a term of relevance. However, looking at these same facts, one can point to the basic
foundation of sectarianism laid out by our earlier analysis. The terms of the mandate and the
policies enacted upon the people produced a sectarian divide by increasing the representation of
smaller religious groups over the larger Sunni majority. Thus, it is important to note that the
interaction between France and the mandated territory through these early years created a basis
for future tensions. It is equally important to understand the weight of the state system as it
brought into focus the concepts of minorities and majorities, concepts which only served to
aggravate sectarian tensions.
According to White’s assessment of the concept of minority, prior to the mandate Syrian
society rarely used the term “minority” or any related words. By the 1930s, White claims that
Syrian and French officials were regularly using the term.143 For this thesis, the importance of
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the term “minority” is that the concept is intimately linked to sectarianism. If a state perceives its
identity as split between minorities and a majority and this is the predominantly salient form of
identification, then the state identity is sectarian in nature. This is unlike states that hold these
concepts of minorities and majorities within their state identities but have an overriding identity
that forms a unified communal state identity. Members of the community who sought minority
protection under the French not only gave credence to the mandate system, but also supported reconstituting the mandate system under the League of Nations. Thus, we will briefly assess
White’s findings and analyze the implication for sectarianism in Syria during the mandate
period.
In 1936, Syria was partially successful in gaining independence and being recognized by
the League of Nations.144 However, under the agreement, France still had the right to intervene
on behalf of minorities, which was possible due to the minority treaties within the international
law of states. This law gave minorities the power to call on a higher authority than the Syrian
government. According to White, this reconstituted groups based on minority-majority ideas.
White’s survey of l’Asie Francaise, a bulletin edited by the High Commissioner Robert de Caix,
shows that articles discussing the Levant using the term minority from 1915 to 1932 are
approximately 70 pages, which is considered infrequent given the length of the articles and the
approximately 17 year period. However, in a much shorter period of six years, from 1933 to
1939, the mention of minorities also runs to 70 pages.145 This shows the increased use of the
term and thus the increased salience of the minority-majority identification.
Constructing Sectarianism during the Mandate
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I now aim to synthesize the Syrian-mandate period through a Constructivist analysis, first
through a unit-level interaction analysis and then zooming outward to assess the system in which
these sectarian notions came to life. There is one essential question that must be asked first: why
did the French perceive Syrian nationalism as a threat? This powerful idea, of the danger of
Syrian nationalism to French interests, essentially led the French to support the growth of a
sectarian system within Syria, which thus reinforced sectarian identities. This idea was due in
part to France’s desire to sustain influence in the country – and the region generally. Thus,
France came to perceive its interests as opposed to the interests of nationalists. As Wendt so
rightly stated “amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.”146 Since Sunni Muslims
were the most likely to hold nationalistic sentiments, they were therefore perceived as an
adversary and France enacted policies in favor of other religious groups, mainly Alawis and
Druze who were viewed as less likely to pose a threat.
The Syrian role in helping constitute this identity is also essential. France’s initial
divisive vision of Syrian society would simply be a meaningless notion if it were not for the
Syrians constituting themselves within this frame as well. How can we tell that Syrians did
perceive these same ideas of sectarian religious divisions? Syrians who accepted the French
mandate and actually sought the support of the French in protecting their “minority rights” gave
credence to the very notion of “minority” while simultaneously supporting in constituting the
role of the League of Nations and France as arbitrators in Syrian affairs. Those who sought to
create a religiously inclusive notion of the Syrian identity – like Yusuf al-‘ssa – also show that
sectarian identities were powerful enough that they needed to be combatted with unifying visions
of what it means to be “Syrian.”
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Expanding outward to view the system as a whole, we can see that these powerful ideas
were accepted within the international system as a whole. The League of Nations sanctioned the
mandate and thus supported in constituting the role of the French as an authority over Syria and
other regions. Without the acceptance of the system itself, France’s perception of its identity as
the keeper of Syria would simply be a fantasy. However, its own self-identification as well as the
systemic acceptance of this role allowed France’s power to grow and burgeon in Syria.
Still, one cannot take the systemic acceptance of France as an authority over its Arab
neighbors for granted. This acceptance has its own roots in a culture of Orientalism, like the
British-Iraqi situation in chapter two. The dominant Orientalist notion of the West’s power over
the East and its rightful role as the civilizer of backward societies gave credence to France’s
interests in the region. The systemic Orientalist culture thus helped constitute France’s identity
and its actions in Syria, which pushed forth a religious-sectarian identity on the new state once it
was formed.
Thus, we can see that the French mandate period supported creating the first visions of
sectarian Syria. Within a supportive systemic environment, France possessed the legitimacy it
needed to pursue its interests in Syria. The fear of nationalists gave France an interest in courting
religious minorities, who were perceived as more likely allies. This policy created a sense of
disenfranchisement by the majority who then felt a greater sense of religious identity due to the
discriminatory policies that enabled certain sects to thrive while others were neglected. By the
end of the mandate period, the Alawis found themselves in a strategically powerful position that
would come to shape the remaining modern history of Syria.

The First Lion: Minority Domination & Intermestics Reinforce Sectarianism
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The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any differences existing among its sons are
accidental and unimportant. They will disappear with the awakening of the Arab
consciousness… The national bond will be the only bond existing in the Arab state. It
ensures harmony among the citizens by melting them in the crucible of a single nation,
and combats all other forms of factional solidarity such as religious, sectarian, tribal,
racial and regional factionalism.147
The passage above comes from the Constitution of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and
puts forth an ideal image of Syria in the mid-twentieth century, less than twenty years after Syria
officially became the Syrian Republic and escaped French mandate rule.148 After gaining
independence in 1946, Syria experienced several political shifts, including the military coup of
1946, executed by three Sunni leaders, as well as the short-lived United Arab Republic that
briefly unified Egypt and Syria. In 1963, the Baath party successfully staged another coup that
would shape the remaining modern history of Syria prior to the Syrian civil war.
Due to the centrality of the Baath party in Syria’s modern history, the original
composition of the party needs to be briefly reviewed. The party originally recruited members
from rural migrants that came to Damascus to study.149 Founded by Christian Michel Aflaq and
Sunni Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the two recruited through traditional social channels.
Aflaq’s personal ties to the Druze region led him to spread the party among that population. The
party’s socialist ideals appealed to rural students who attended university and joined the party
then spread its ideology back in their own hometowns. According to an early member of the
Baath, Sami al-Jundi, “The social conditions in rural areas were favorable to the growth and
spread of the party. It expanded there and remained weak in the cities…especially in Damascus.
In the course of time, therefore, it became a big body with a small head.” Since most rural areas
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were dominated by Arab-speaking religious minorities, the Baath became a reflection of this
group.
At its core, the Baath party didn’t seem to present a sectarian threat to Syria. The Baath –
or Renaissance – ideology combined European socialism with Arab nationalism.150 The party
aimed to return to the virtues of the Jahiliyya, the period of time before Islam before the Turks
and Persians tainted the honorable character and purity of the Arab identity. Its slogan was
“Unity, Freedom and Socialism.” In a speech in 1957, Aflaq emphasized the centrality of the
Arab identity in uniting Syrians:
Our movement sees colonialism more as a result than as a cause, a result of whatever
defects and distortions adulterate our society… The atmosphere created by previous
movements… was a false atmosphere which concealed from the people the reality of the
problem. They did not understand or deem it right that our problem, in all Arab regions,
was one problem, that the unification of the struggle was necessary, that the separation
which had been imposed on our land was artificial and obstructive, and that in the hearts
of the people was a guarantee that the rust would be cleared, that the falseness (of the
separation) would disappear and that the fact that our nation was one nation would
become apparent.151
Despite such noble speech, the practical implications of the party’s rise to power led to
clear sectarian divisions. After the Baathist coup, the new ruling party set up the National
Council of the Revolutionary Command and immediately purged of Nasserist officers, or
sympathizers of the United Arab Republic who were mainly Sunnis.152 Pro-Nasser newspaper
editors were imprisoned and non-Baath publications were banned. Predominantly Sunni Kurds
also faced similar suppression. Kurds weren’t allowed to join the Baath party due to their “un-
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Arab” character and many were expelled to Turkey, an act justified by claiming that Kurds were
actually “mountain Turks.” Thousands of Sunni Kurds were stripped of their citizenship and thus
deemed foreigners even if they possessed valid Syrian IDs. Corrupt elections for the Regional
Congress in 1963 brought Baathists to all eight seats of the Regional Command. The active
disenfranchisement of Nasserist, Kurds and other predominantly Sunni groups became
interpreted as an active attack against Sunnis in Syria.
Baathist Recruitment & Alawi Domination
Despite the party opening membership to all Syrians, including non-Arabs, the party’s
original membership composition determined its future identity. At the time of the coup, the
party had only secured 600 civilian members among its ranks. Due to this limited size, it took
major steps to bolster its support base.153 The party promoted all current members to “active
members,” which gave them new rights to nominate members to the party as well as participate
in party elections. The party more than quintupled within one year as a result of this change.
“Active membership” was also given more freely to new recruits, regardless of any original
criteria such as level of education. The party became more and more homogenous, with members
recruiting those of their religious or tribal background regardless of support for the Baathist
ideology. An organization report published in 1965 states: “[There is a] presence of personal
relationships rather than party relationships…The result of all this is that the party is threatened
by the infiltration into its midst of the disorders of bourgeois, feudal, tribal and sectarian
realities.”154
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Five of the fourteen members of the Baathist Military Committee were Alawi, with the
highest leadership posts in the hands of three Alawi – Muhammad ‘Umran, Salah Jadid and
Hafiz al-Assad.155 Religious minorities made up the majority of party members. The party
purged Nasserist and Independent Unionist members in the army. This disproportionately
affected Sunni Muslims, who made up the bulk of Nasserists and Independent Unionists. During
the Nasserist rebellion in July 18, 1963, the minority-dominated (specifically Alawi dominated)
army cracked down on dissidents. Anti-Baathist publications started to appear claiming a
sectarian character of the Syrian Baathist regime. One opposition leader, Muta Safadi, wrote:
“Dismissals by the hundreds were all aimed at officers originating from the bigger cities, and
especially the Sunnis.” In 1966, coup-leaders purged Sunni officer factions. According to
secretary-general of the National Command of the Baath party in 1965 and 1966 Dr. Munif alRazzaz:
The smells of deliberate sectarian bloc formation started to emanate. At first it was
whispered about, but later the voices became louder, as it appeared that there were real
indications that the accusations [stating that in their struggle for power, the military had
exploited sectarian ties in such a way as to have specifically negative results from the
Sunnis] were well-founded.156
The situation continued to lean in favor of religious minorities with the second-phase of
the Baath regime in 1966 when Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Assad successfully defeated their rivals
to take control of the party.157 Leading officers were Alawi, Druze and Isma’ili, members of the
smallest religious groups in Syria. With growing conflict between different party factions, the
Isma’ilis were eventually eliminated from the party and Assad was able to solidify his hold in the
1970s.
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Sectarian divisions were clearly apparent during the Assad regime. Prior to the Baath
coup, from 1942 until 1963, Sunnis, urbanites and the upper class held the highest government
posts, with approximately 95 percent Sunni representation in the Regional Congress during the
Syrian-Egyptian union.158 From 1958 until 1961, no Christians were represented at all in the
Regional Congress. After 1963, there was a clear shift, with a domination of the main power
institutions by those from poor rural areas, who predominantly held unorthodox Islamic
ideologies like the Alawi, Druze and Isma’ili. From 1966 until 1970, major cities like Damascus
and Aleppo, predominantly Sunni strongholds, remained completely unrepresented in the
regime’s power structures. Thirty percent of the Regional Congress came from Latakia, a
predominantly Alawi stronghold, another twenty percent came from Hawran and fifteen percent
came from Dayr al-Zur. Alawis held the strongest representation at nearly twenty-five percent, a
group that only made up eleven percent of the Syrian population as a whole. One of the founding
members of the Baath and the Minister of Information in the cabinet after the Baathist coup,
Sami al-Jundi, narrated the following:
Three days after my entering the Ministry, the [party] comrades came to ask me for an
extensive purge operation… the measure of a minister’s success [was determined by] the
lists of dismissals, since party members as well as their relatives and the members of their
tribes [came to] demand their campaign and kinship rights. From the time the party
appeared on the stage, caravans of villagers started to leave the villages of the plains and
mountains for Damascus.159
Despite Assad’s attempts to co-opt the Sunnis in the 1970s by increasing their
representation among Regional Command members, the divisive nature of the regime had shown
its true colors. In the late 1970s, several political assassinations targeted mostly Alawis. 160 An
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extremist Sunni group took credit for the actions in the newsletter al-Nadhir. In it, the group
explicitly mentions the sectarian motives behind the attacks.
The first bullet, however, was the result of long and persistent suffering from oppression
and terror. The prisons of Syria were packed with [Sunni] Muslim prisoners… The ordeal
reached its climax, however, when oppression became concentrated against the [Sunni]
Muslims and against the Islamic religion in particular: mosques were destroyed; religious
scholars arrested; educational programmes were banned….the country was handed piece
by piece to the Jews; the [Alawi] sectarian party militia were allowed to take the place of
the regular armed forces.161
The above shows the powerful constitution of competing Syrian religious identities. The
newsletter puts the “sectarian party militia” at odds with the “Muslim prisoners.” This clearly
pitted the Sunnis against the Alawis, who are associated with “the Jews,” a traditional sectarian
nemesis of Muslims. This kind of discourse attempted to frame Alawis as outside of the Muslim
tradition. Thus, the biased nature of the Baathist regime and its sectarian attacks against the
Sunnis gave extremist Sunnis the ammo needed to create a sectarian discourse that pitted the
Alawis and Sunnis against each other.
Sectarian occurrences became more frequent in Syria. In June 1979, thirty-two cadets
from the Syrian military were murdered, led by a Sunni member from within the Baath party. 162
Again, the attack was viewed as a direct assault on Alawis, despite the fact that others were
victims. Reports showed that the commando unit which executed the attack forcefully separated
Sunni and Alawi cadet officers before carrying out the attack.163 The regime blamed the Syrian
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood for the massacre and took measures to retaliate against
Muslim Brotherhood members.
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Intermestics Reinforce Sectarian Divides
In parallel with these domestic occurrences, the international community played its part
in aggravating tensions. Power and identity politics were at play between Syria and Egypt since
the fall of the United Arab Republic, as proven by various records from the 1960s.164 A series of
correspondence records from the British Embassy describes discussions about the political
animosity between the Baathist party and Egyptian President Nasser, as highlighted by a series
of anti-Baath articles written by the popular Egyptian journalist Mohammed Hassanein Heikal in
the sixties. More than a decade later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat turned the discourse from
attacks on the Baathist as a whole to sectarian attacks against the Alawis specifically. In a speech
in 1979, Sadat fueled sectarianism as he declared, “Let these dirty Alawis speak for it. These are
people who have lost all life’s meaning.”165 Furthermore, discourse on Radio Cairo, which was
widely listened to in the Arab world, further fueled sectarianism by attacking the identity of the
Syrian regime. In Cairo’s al-Akhar newspaper, an editorial narrates the occurrences of the attack
on the Alawis and the retaliation as follows:
If news of this massacre came as a surprise to some people and aroused fear and
consternation, it was no surprise to those who are conversant with the facts of the
situation in Syria and the atrocities which Alawi Baathist rule is committing against the
Syrian people. This massacre was only one link in a long chain of crimes and
assassinations and of other acts of suppression and coercion to which the Alawi Baath
Party resorts in order to humiliate the Syrian people and to guarantee its own rule. The
Syrian people were bound to rise against such humiliation and to defend themselves…
The massacre [of Alawi cadets] took place ten days ago but was kept secret, so that
henchmen of the Alawi regime could go on a murder rampage among non-Alawis or
Sunnis. News agencies have said that most of those recently killed were Sunnis and that
killing in revenge for the massacre of Alawis in Aleppo is continuing. As a result, Syria is
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in danger of becoming the victim of inter-communal strife and civil war, similar to the
Lebanese civil war.166
The Baath party, which was specifically identified by its Alawi nature, is clearly
juxtaposed with the “Syrian people.” The Alawi are placed as the “other” within Syrian society,
much like the Sunni extremist discourse within Syria. This can be seen by the way the author of
the editorial describes how “the Alawi Baath Party” acted “to humiliate the Syrian people.” This
implies that the Alawis are not a part of the “Syrian people” as the religious group as a whole is
contrasted with Syrian citizens. This is the same method used by President Sadat when he made
no differentiation between the leaders of the Baath party and the “dirty Alawis.” Similarly,
Hussein of Jordan highlighted the Alawi nature of the regime.167
There was an internal and external battle for the identity of Syria. In 1979, Assad gave a
speech in which he said “the concept of ‘homeland’ loses its meaning if its citizens are not equal.
This equality is an integral part of Islam… [I] lead it [Syria]… not in the name of a religion or of
a religious community, despite the fact that Islam is the religion of the majority.”168 Assad
claimed that sectarian tensions were the result of “a conspiracy against our country” and blamed
the Muslim Brotherhood in both his speech and state propaganda. Anti-Brotherhood propaganda
labeled the group “traitors, renegades and heretics.” In another speech in the opening of the
Seventh Syrian Regional Congress session, on December 22, 1979, Assad states “May God curse
them and their Islam. We shall not have one Islam with them. They are murderers of Islam and
Muslims. They are traitors of Islam and Muslims.” A deeper systemic and unit-level analysis of
the construction of the Syrian identity is essential to our understanding of sectarianism.
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Systemically, several factors are at play in regards to the battle over the identity of both
the regime and Syria. The Egyptian and Jordanian attempts to define Assad’s regime by its
“Alawi” nature is part of a greater battle over the region’s general identity. Tensions between
Egypt and Syria had grown since the break-up of the union in the sixties.169 Not only did the
Baath regime take control of the country but they also purged the Sunnis in power institutions
upon ascending to power. This posed a threat to the general Sunni Arab vision of the region,
even if unity under such an ideal was no longer possible. At the same time as these events were
happening, the region faced the Shia Islamic threat of the Iranian Revolution. The Alawi-Sunni
conflict in Syria can thus be situated within a larger battle for the identity of the region as Sunni
Arab, which explains Jordan and Egypt’s reaction towards the new Syrian regime and their
strong condemnation of the “Alawi Baath.”
Domestically, the actions of the regime allowed the growth of sectarian religious
discourse and sentiment. The regime supported the earlier constitution of sectarian divisions
inherited from the French by allowing sectarianism to flourish within its ranks. The purging of
Sunnis from power structures and the deliberate attacks on Sunnis allowed for sectarian religious
identities to become more salient. Further aggravating these sentiments was the Alawi and
minority domination of power structures despite their small representation among the Syrian
population as a whole. While Assad may have brought forth a unified Arab image from his
discourse upon his ascent to power, his actions conveyed a different message altogether. The
concerns about the minority-status of most of the members of the Baath leadership and power
structures fueled Baathist interest in eliminating the ideological threat that the party believed the
Sunnis posed. Therefore, this idea of the importance of the religious identity of leaders created
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sectarian interests that led to actions which further fueled sectarian sentiments within the country
and abroad, within the systemic environment previously analyzed.
The Hama Massacre & Its Sectarian Legacy
The situation reached its peak with the Hama Massacre. An attempted assassination of
Hafiz al-Assad in 1980 led the regime to execute several attacks against the Brotherhood, and
more generally Sunnis.170 Two units led by President Assad’s brother Rif’at were ordered to kill
all Muslim Brotherhood members who were held in the Palmyra prison. The operation led to the
death of 550 Muslim Brotherhood prisoners who were gunned down while trapped in their prison
cells. The bloodiest attacks came nearly two years later in February in the city of Hama, a
predominantly Sunni city. The showdown between the Alawi Baath units and the Brotherhood
escalated to unprecedented levels of violence, killing anywhere from an estimated 5000 to 25000
victims.171 Nearly ten percent of the city’s population was decimated. What matters for this
thesis is not the details of who the victims were but the perception at the time and afterwards of
whether or not the regime-led attacks were sectarian in nature.
Looking at newspaper reports from the time of the massacre can shed light on the
discourse around the attacks. Due to Assad’s extreme censorship, it is difficult to find
information about the events, even in terms of literary works.172 I will thus rely partially on
reporting from outside of Syria. An editorial in the Guardian on February 24 narrates a dark
image of the events that transpired:
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There has been little eye-witness stuff from the city of Hama, but the reports of escaping
travelers and the Intelligence assessments of Western embassies combine to provide a
picture of merciless carnage carried out by the Government’s private Alawite security
force in which certainly hundreds, probably thousands, have been killed and in which
parts of the city have been reduced to rubble.173
The massacre is associated primarily with the Assad regime but is still identified with the
Alawi community due to the make-up of the security forces who executed the orders, which are
described as part of the “Government’s private Alawite security force.” A year after the
massacre, Guardian reporter David Hirst interviewed Hama citizens about the destruction of the
city's mosques, a telling sign that the regime targeted not only the people of Hama but their faith.
In the article, one Hama resident recalled the following: “when President Assad first came here
in 1971, the people slaughtered sheep and camels in his honor.”174 He, as well as others, felt
disillusioned by what had transpired.
In contemporary Syrian literature, there is little in regards to the Hama massacre, though
there is plenty of information about other occurrences, such as conflicts with the Turks and the
British. In one authors’ literary analysis, this “silence on Hama is notable, given the sophisticated
levels of political consciousness present among Syrian writers.”175 This is partially explained as a
result of state patronage to writers, who thus relied on the state for their livelihoods and could not
freely criticize state affairs. However, the analysis points to several literary works which
indirectly refer to the incident. In a poem referenced at the beginning of this chapter, prolific
Syrian writer Nizar Kabbani writes:
a citizen afraid to pray –
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What if the State Police stake out the prayer line?
They might say I tried to contact the Merciful on High
Worse, they might accuse me
of perpetrating faith
- God, what a place176
The author alludes to the reality and fear of certain groups in Syria, as a result of the
Hama rebellion. Given the sectarian nature of the attacks executed by the regime and the overall
sectarian policies enacted by the Baath, it is logical to conclude that this fear was most strongly
felt by Sunnis who had the greatest reason to fear the regime and its repressive nature. In a
memoir written during the Syrian civil war, one woman described the sentiment around political
repression after the crackdown on the Brotherhood in Hama nearly three decades prior to the
civil war: “We used to call Syria the ‘Kingdom of Silence’ and it deserved the name. The 1980s
were full of pain, a decade that saw the most widespread campaign of political oppression.”177
Part of the legacy of Hafiz would be the massacre in Hama, but could the tide turn? After
Hafiz’s death, there seemed to be hope that perhaps Syria had entered a new era. Bashar
represented new hope, with his Western education and anti-corruption stance. Would he overturn
decades of inherited sectarian strife or would he continue to fuel the flame?

An Inconsistent Leader: the Bashar al-Assad Regime Plays with Sectarian Fire
Today and tomorrow we are in desperate need to creative minds in order to push the
development process forward…We are also in desperate need to constructive criticism
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which is the exact opposite of destructive criticism that often colors most discussions and
proposals for various reasons whether they are personal or otherwise.178
After his father’s death, Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power initially brought a welcome ray
of hope for Syrians. The young Assad took control of a Syria that was largely isolated from the
rest of the world, with no internet access and a ban on satellite TV.179 Bashar gave way for the
legalization of satellite TV and brought improvements in technology by supporting the growth of
mobile phone networks and the internet. Bashar’s cosmopolitan Sunni wife Asma also brought a
welcome indication that perhaps the new regime wouldn’t be marred by the old sectarian
leniencies. It appeared that Syria might have a new progressive leader that could perhaps bring
forward a new political agenda that might bring prosperity to the people and support national
unity.
The so-called “Damascus Spring” further supported the new hopes for Syria. During the
Damascus Spring in 2001, the regime implemented more liberal policies and political opposition
briefly thrived. The short Damascus Spring led the way for the burgeoning of political groups
and even witnessed the release of hundreds of political prisoners.180 Civil society seemed to
suddenly flourish, with a number of debating clubs forming during that time. The Civil Society
Movement was one of the many groups that briefly experienced this moment of hope. As a
secular network of intellectuals, journalists, actors, doctors, professors and other professionals,
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the group sought to slowly transition Syria into a more progressive state by pursuing incremental
changes and avoiding violent methods.181
During the Damascus Spring, Syrian opposition groups and people of all ideologies
joined forces to write the “Manifesto of 99,” which presented a number of the desires and
demands of the people, mostly related to increasing freedoms.182 The “Manifesto of the 1000”
soon followed but presented more threatening demands, including political party plurality.
The new freedoms came as fast as they disappeared, only a year after it began. Debating
clubs that formed were soon banned and Syria’s prisons filled back up with opposition members.
According to philosopher and Civil Society Movement member Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, “His
[Bashar’s] original sin was not to offer national reconciliation. Many even said that he would be
ready to reconcile with Israel but not with his own people.”183
Assad reshuffled the administration continuously throughout his years in power. In the
first two years alone, he replaced more than 75 percent of the leading officials in politics,
including in the military and administration.184 In place of the former heads, technocrats were
placed in key positions. Top officials seemed to have relatively clean records. However, while
Assad promised to limit Baathist power and confine the party to the ideological domain, his
promises went unfulfilled. Baathist members in his new cabinet were in eighteen of the positions,
as opposed to the former fifteen members under his father.185 By 2004, the regime began to take
steps to consolidate Bashar’s power by purging those opposed to the new president. There were
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more Alawis in power during Bashar’s time than during the reign of his father.186 Bashar
dismissed two of the regime’s oldest Sunni loyalists, Khaddam and Tlass, in favor of members of
his extended family, who were Alawis.187 And as author Carsten Wieland wrote, during 2011
“with rising stakes in the conflict and increasing brutality it was above all Alawis (and to a lesser
extent Christians, Druze and Ismailis) who were exposed to existential fear of retaliation,
although some Alawi figures counted among important representatives of the opposition.” For
our purposes, it is perhaps not so important if the Alawis were all supportive of Bashar or not,
but that there was a sentiment among the people that Alawis were the people of Bashar and were
his supporters based on their religious ties.
Bashar’s regime would continue to be marred by inconsistent statements and policies
until the 2011 revolution. The regime oscillated between moving towards and against certain
oppositional groups. The following sections will aim to assess the regime’s relations with the
secularists, Islamists, moderates and Christians. These assessments will allow for a more
thorough understanding of the construction of sectarianism in Syria today.
Silencing Secularist Visions of Reconciliation
Bashar’s regime had an inconsistent relationship with secularists in society, despite the
Baath’s professed secular nature. After the war in Iraq, the government seemed to attempt to
ameliorate its relation with secularists by voicing approval of the opposition.188 In May 2004, the
Lebanese newspaper al-Safir, Bahjat Suleiman, a powerful leader of the Syrian intelligence
service, wrote, “In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but ‘opponents’ whose demands do
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not go beyond certain political and economic reforms such as the end of the state of emergency.”
The commentary seemed to praise the secular opposition’s aims and framed the opposition as
critical but not adversaries.
Michel Kilo, a leader of the Civil Society Movement, was allowed for the first time to
publish a piece critical of the regime in March 2004.189 He was even allowed to speak on Syrian
television, also for the first time. During the interview, Kilo referred to the 1963 Baathist coup
when he said “Syria needs a different beginning than that of March 8.”
Many of the occurrences in the following period show that the Syrian people began to reconstitute themselves along a more unified front, which disregarded the barriers of sectarian
identities. New alliances were formed in 2005 when twelve unlicensed parties and groups created
a committee for the “national coordination of the defense of basic and human rights.” The group
included Kurdish activists, Civil Society Movement members and communists.190 Oppositional
groups abroad also joined forces and gathered in Brussels in June 2004. Kilo explained the
regime’s sudden leniency as follows: “Because of it [oppositional activities abroad] our voice
has become much louder and bolder. The regime will have to give us more leeway since they’re
afraid we’ll join up with supporters abroad. We have threatened to do so. We have to become
even more aggressive.”
More steps were taken by the people towards what seemed to be national reconciliation.
The Damascus Declaration of 16 October 2005 unified even more groups, including the secular
Civil Society Movement, the Kurds, moderate Muslims and the banned Muslim Brotherhood that
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was now based out in London. The Declaration was a broad appeal for democratic change that
would shun “totalitarian thought” and sever “all plans for exclusion.”191 It called for:
[a] new social contract… [with a] modern democratic constitution that makes citizenship
the criterion of affiliation, and adopts pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and the
rule of law in a state all of whose citizens enjoy the same rights and have the same duties,
regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, sect, or clan and prevents the return of tyranny in
new forms.
It further adopted an inclusive appeal to the Muslim Brothers and other Islamic affiliates
by proclaiming that “Islam – which is the religion and ideology of the majority, with its lofty
intentions, higher values, and tolerant canon law – is the most prominent cultural component in
the life of the nation and the people.”192 The document was very explicit in its mention of
religion and its aim for unification and equality. To emphasize this point further, it states that the
new society should be “free of fanaticism, violence and exclusion, while having great concern
for the respect of the beliefs, culture, and special characteristics of others, whatever their
religious, confessional and intellectual affiliations and openness to new and contemporary
cultures.”
This declaration is intriguing analytically for a variety of reasons. First, its explicit
mention of the need to shun “totalitarian thought” and adopt pluralism validates our previous
analysis about the exclusivity in Syrian politics. The sectarian nature of that exclusivity is also
shown by the frequent mention of religion and the need for equal rights and power distribution
that would apply “regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, sect, or clan.” The other interesting
component of this declaration is the attempt to constitute a new identity, one that could perhaps
use Islam as a cultural identity to unify the people, unlike Hafiz al-Assad who had used Arabism
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as the unifying commonality amongst Syrians. The various groups involved in this declaration
are thus not passively accepting the rule of the state and its outcomes, but are actively seeking to
create a new identity for Syrians that would unify them in a new and more equal society.
The group went beyond simple words and formed the National Council for Democratic
Change in January 2007.193 Alawis, Christians and Sunnis once again joined forces to actualize
their interests. More than 150 people came to the first meeting, which lasted for more than
twelve hours. The group was a mix of females and males, with its president a female doctor
named Fida al-Howrani and included a variety of ideologically and politically diverse members.
Secularists and moderate Islamists were working together to formulate a new platform to
modernize Syria. This diverse group shows that the opposition against the regime refused to
constitute Syrian identity along sectarian lines. Instead of allowing the regime to define Syria
alone, the group aimed to reconstitute the Syrian identity along unifying principles.
However, the hope that came from the spirited words of the Declaration and the
aspirations of those who had been able to overcome numerous obstacles to form a unified front
were quickly extinguished by another crackdown by the regime. Within a month of the initial
meeting, the main leaders of the group were arrested.194 Riad Seif, an independent
parliamentarian and entrepreneur who participated in writing the Declaration, was the last of
twelve leaders of the group to be arrested in 2007. The regime enforced travel bans and strict
surveillance on those suspected of membership in this or other oppositional groups. In 2010, the
regime canceled a secular conference organized at the University of Damascus.195

193

Ibid., 153.

194

Ibid., 153-157.

195

Ibid., 177.
82

By 2010, the opposition seemed to have lost the hope that it once felt at the beginning of
the new millennium. According to Michel Kilo, “The political opposition are at loggerheads with
one another. They jointly signed the Damascus Declaration, and now one suspects the other of
being an American agent.”196 When talking of the Civil Society Movement, Kilo remained proud
of the work done, “we were the driving force, not the political parties… The intellectuals
delivered the proof that the Syrian street was not dead, and that the middle class was vibrant and
full of ideas. But the intellectuals who moved things became the main targets of the regime.”
According to Seif, the unified message of the Declaration and its member groups was one that
appealed to a diverse array of Syrians. “If people were not afraid of punishment, the support
would be unlimited… We are liberals, nationalists, Islamists, Kurds, Arabs, communists, etc. We
are a team that represents Syria as it is. Our commonness was democracy.”
Increasing Religious Discourse & Encouraging Radical Islam
The Muslim Brotherhood’s history in Syria prior to the Bashar regime was marred by the
history of the Hama massacre. From the 1980s, membership in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
organization was not only prohibited but punishable by death. The regime exiled leaders of the
movement to London.197 The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, however, was unique among its
neighboring affiliated groups due to its relations with non-Islamist opposition movements. In
fact, there was regular contact between the secular Civil Society Movement and the Brotherhood.
Moreover, as we have seen, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a participating agent in the active
attempts to form a national coalition opposition. The focus of the Syrian Muslim Brothers on
democracy, freedom of speech and other popular issues allowed them to easily collaborate with
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other opposition groups. According to Kilo, a Christian and a leader of the Civil Society
Movement:
I believe they [the Muslim Brotherhood] are a moderate force with a strong democratic
tendency… Therefore we won’t give the regime the chance to play us off against each
other… If my opinion is the expression of a civil and secular democracy and theirs is an
Islamic one, this is all right as long as we have democracy as a common denominator. We
will accept the Muslims coming to power through elections, provided that they accept the
democratic system… We have no problems with Islamic groups and organizations. I
mean when the Islamists become democrats, they won’t frighten us anymore.
Despite the cooperation between the secularists and the Muslim Brothers, the
Brotherhood’s relationship with the Bashar regime was more favorable than the secularists. In
2004, the regime began to reach out to the group, perhaps in an attempt for reconciliation.198
While the regime continued to refuse to apologize for what happened in Hama, it did extend an
olive branch. In April, Bashar met with leading Islamists from the region, Islamists with direct
connections to the Syrian branch. Later, he also directly contacted the Muslim Brothers, which
was more of a sign of friendship than the regime had shown to secularist groups. The idea of
getting rid of the death penalty as a punishment for membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was
brought up by a parliamentary member. An even more telling sign of the regime’s changed
attitude came with the arrest of Nabil Fayyad, an intellectual who had written critically of the
growing influence of radical Islamists. The regime seemed to be siding with the Islamists over
their secular counterparts. The Hama massacre was even deemed a “tragic event” by Imad
Mustafa, a Syrian Ambassador to the US. Former members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had
been exiled were allowed to return upon apologizing for what happened in Hama. According to
philosopher Tayyeb Tizini, “The regime has sometimes actively supported the Islamists because
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they wanted to keep them as a visible danger to the secular opposition: ‘Just look, this is the
danger. Either you have us or you get them.’”199
Unlike secularists that had no safe space to meet due to the regime’s policies, the Muslim
Brothers and Islamists in general had countless safe havens including Quranic schools and
mosques.200 While meetings of more than five people were banned in regular public spaces due
to active martial law, the policy didn’t apply to religious institutions which had no surveillance.
According to Saleh, the meeting ban “applies to us in the Civil Society Movement… But nobody
forbids people to go to the mosques in crowds and assemble for talks.” And according to
political scientist Salam Kawkibi in an interview in 2004, “The regime is now doing all it can to
survive. This includes approaching the Muslim Brothers. It is trying to curry favor with everyone
except the secular Civil Society Movement… Nowadays there are hundreds of mosques in
Damascus but not a single meeting hall for secular people. This says everything.”
There was a sense that moderate Islam was being stifled while radical variants were left
to flourish. In 2010, two moderate Islamic centers were shut down.201 According to Sheikh
Muhammad al-Habash, former director of one of the centers that was closed, “The Ministry is
very intolerant. They want to convert everyone to conservative Islam and we as imams should be
instruments for this.” Another indication of the increasingly conservative rhetoric of the Islam
supported by the regime was revealed in 2009 during the drafting of a new Personal Status
Law.202 Sunni Islamists dominated the panel chosen for the task. An outcry from moderates soon
followed as a result of the strict interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence used in the new
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document. The new law would strengthen male rights at the expense of women and minority
rights were weakened. Restrictions were placed on Christian and other minority clergy, who
would have to rely on the state for their own internal religious affairs. The outrage peaked with
an online campaign against the change in parallel with online advocacy and lobbying to dismiss
the new law. Revisions to the draft produced in 2009 did nothing to ameliorate the opposition
that feared the conservative rhetoric within the law, and continued protests eventually led the
regime to dismiss the matter.
Furthermore, the regime’s opposition to the US was bolstered by the Islamists, who
already held anti-American stance. Bashar allowed for the transit of Sunni jihadists from his
borders into Iraq.203 This support of jihadist activities in the neighboring country no doubt had
repercussions internally. Assad consistently deemed Iraqi rebels a “legitimate resistance.”204
Despite these conservative leniencies, by 2010, the tide seemed to turn once again with a
number of measures against Islamists.205 Prayer rooms were shut down in popular restaurants
along with public prayer rooms during Ramadan. The niqab was banned in schools for both
teachers and girls, and curriculum in schools became more secular.
Further adding to the resentment of Sunnis was the economic situation.206 Bashar’s
regime had cut subsidies for ordinary citizens and this, along with the drought that was
experienced in Syria from 2006 until 2010, led to the further disenfranchisement and
impoverishment of mostly Sunni peasants who were hit the worst. The Sunni peasants who had
been on the side of Hafiz were now even more frustrated with his son. According to interviews,
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there was some resentment between religious groups as a result of the perceived empowerment
of Alawi migrants over other peasants. Thus, the regime fueled sectarianism by allowing
religiosity to grow at the expense of secularists, while at the same time adding to the grievances
of Sunnis due to the regime’s inconsistent policies.
Flourishing Christian Society & Muslim-Christian Relations
The bulk of research in the area of Syria focuses predominantly on the Alawis and
Sunnis, given that one has been in power for the last several decades and the other is part of the
majority. The role of Christians in comprehensive works on Syria is often in passing, but is
central to our understanding of sectarian construction. This short section aims to give a glimpse
into the role of Christians during Bashar’s regime and the role they played in constructing some
form of national unity.
During Bashar’s regime, Christians raised concerns about the growing conservative
Sunni movement, like their secular and moderate Muslim counterparts, but they generally
seemed to enjoy good relations with the regime.207 Christians in Syria held equal rights in the
law, except for the stipulation in the constitution that the president must be Muslim. Christian
churches flourished in Syria and even enjoyed state support, with exemptions from taxes like
mosques. The degree to which Syria was a sanctuary for Christians is shown by the large number
of Iraqi Christian refugees that flooded the country after the American invasion of Iraq. In the
summer months of 2004, more than a quarter of a million Christians were reported to have fled
from Iraq into Syria for refuge. By 2005, there were more than 700,000 refugees of all faiths in
Syria. Seventy percent of refugees in Syria in 2010 had been in Syria for more than four years,
which can either be an indication of refugees’ lack of an alternative choice or as a sign of the
207

Ibid., 88-90.
87

relative liberties enjoyed by refugees in Syria. In general, the literature seems to indicate the
latter.
The literature also indicates that Christians received ample support during Bashar and
Hafiz’s respective regimes. One study of Christian charities actually posits that Christians had a
better relationship with the regime than their Sunni counterparts since they weren’t viewed as a
political threat.208 The regime allowed Christian charities to flourish under its patronage. The
Christians played equal part in the relationship, reinforcing the regime’s secular and pluralistic
image. There is also ample proof of the peaceful coexistence of Muslim and Christian groups, as
was indicated by the earlier statements by Michel Kilo. The Christian charities study in the
previously mentioned research found that Christian charities were inclusive in regards to their
beneficiaries. At one charity, Terre des Hommes Syrie, for example, Muslims made up more
than 95 percent of its beneficiaries in 2008. Muslims also participated on the charity’s board of
directors.
The increased presence of religious institutions and symbols, however, is important in our
understanding of sectarianism. Increased presence of religiously-based entities and symbols,
especially those of extremist fanatics, meant a general increased salience of sectarian religious
identities. Syrians increasingly began seeing religious figures in media discussion and tensions
led to a presidential decree to regulate Muslim religious movements in 2008.209 As one
intellectual, Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, explained it: “There is a kind of competition to demonstrate

208

Christa Salamandra and Leif Stenberg. Syria from Reform to Revolt, Volume 2: Culture, Society, and
Religion. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2015, 93-98.
209

Ibid., 153.
88

more clearly one’s religious identity. The Muslims are building more mosques; the Christians
organize more lavish procession and hang bigger crosses round their necks.”210
Syrian Civil War: A Sectarian Conflict?
As has been seen, Bashar’s regime was inconsistent throughout his ten years in power.
Some have noted that this is due to the fact that it was no longer a one man show, with
conflicting interests between Bashar and the old regime stalwarts.211 Regardless of the reason,
instead of supporting a unified front, such as the one presented by the signatories of the
Declaration, the regime seemed to give mixed signals to secularists and toyed with Islamists.
In part, Bashar’s fears of the opposition in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s may
have also been due to fears of the ongoing war in Iraq. Potential interventions n Syria seemed
like a real possibility at the time. Therefore, systemic factors affected internal affairs by creating
an environment of fear over the potential overturning of the status quo by supporting any form of
opposition. “We don’t want to turn into a second Iraq” was a popular sentiment even amongst
people.212
Bashar thus played with fire while he allowed the threat of the Islamists to dangle in front
of the people and the moderate opposition. The regime allowed conservative Islamists to flourish
to a certain degree in order to show that the regime was better than an alternative. The fact that
the regime allowed this shows that there seemed to be a confidence that such radical
conservativism would not be a popular idea among citizens, which does seem to be the case
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according to our earlier analysis. However, when Islamist power seemed to grow and pose a
threat, the regime once again cracked down on dissidents.
What occurred is problematic in several ways. First, the Bashar regime didn’t form a
consistent message nor did it foster the growth of a particular national identity. While espousing
secularist discourse like the old regime, the regime never took action to support secularists.
Secularists were being attacked while the Islamists flourished. However, it is my analysis that to
a large degree the sentiment of Syrian sectarianism was limited only to a few groups. Unlike the
Iraqi case, there was little evidence in the literature that the people themselves felt bitterness
towards one another on the basis of faith. For the most part, Syrians seemed willing and able to
create diverse opposition groups that showed that Syrian society was not completely marred by
sectarian tendencies despite the fact that the Bashar regime supported policies that could very
easily espouse such sentiments.
However, it is very possible that with the start of the civil war, Bashar’s conspiratorial
and sectarian discourse brought greater salience to sectarian sentiments that had been growing
beneath the surface for decades. The regime fed into sectarian interpretations of the conflict by
acting upon the notion that the issue was sectarian. After the initial protests, the regime
immediately began to make concessions to Sunni Islamists through a number of actions. 213 In
April 2011, the regime lifted the ban on the niqab for teachers and students that had been in place
for about a year. That same month, Sheikh Ramadan al-Bouti indicated that the regime would
allow for the establishment of a religious TV channel, which had previously been demanded by
Sunnis. Islamist political prisoners were set free and a casino was shut down. All indications
point to an attempt by the regime to reconcile with its Islamist opponents. Further concessions
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were made to the Syrian Sunni Kurds, who were finally granted citizenship after decades of
denial. When reconciliation failed, the regime changed its tone. During the civil war, the
government took measures to cleanse all non-Alawis from its ranks, especially Sunni civil
servants.214 Syria would very soon become a hub for a wider radical Islamic movement that
found its enemy in both the rule of autocrats in the region as well as against the West.
The Syrian landscape was complex in 2011 at the start of the civil war. Valiant attempts
had been made by diverse political and civil groups to present their own national vision of Syria
throughout the early 2000s. Their sense of unity was continuously crushed by Bashar throughout
his decade in power. Assad’s regime seemed to support Islamists and radicals over their
secularist counterparts, which bolstered resentments between groups.

Conclusion
Since the days of the mandate, we have seen a push for a unified Syrian identity by the
people while another force from above, both domestically and internationally, attacked this
vision. The literature seems to indicate that there was a sense of unity among opposition groups.
By the twenty-first century, both moderate Islamists and secularists agreed on the danger posed
by radical Islamists and presented a unified vision of Syrian society. These diverse oppositional
groups successfully formed a platform for their vision through in 2007 with the formation of the
National Council for Democratic Change.215 However, due to the Assad regime’s paranoid fears
of all forms of opposition, the group disbanded and many of its leaders were put in jail. Both
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Bashar and Hafiz attempted to put forth a unifying vision of Syria through their discourse but
their actions failed to convert that vision into reality.
Was there a sectarian sentiment in Syria? It seems that the construct of the sectarian
nature of the country was more a result of consistent propaganda internally, especially after the
war broke out, as well as externally by the Western media’s focus on sectarian divisions.216
Oversimplified images of the war were consistently projected, which presented the groups by
single ethno-sectarian agendas. According to Phillips, part of the problem was the confusion of
regional wars which may have led to an “Iraq contagion,” whereby the Syrian conflict was
viewed through the same lens as its neighbor. At the same time, Syrian discourse in the region
also served to perpetuate sectarian anger. On a regular slot on a Saudi TV channel, the Syrian
Sheikh Adnan al-Arour continued to feed anger towards the Alawis.217 Similarly, Qatari-owned
Al-Jazeera further fueled the flame. In a 2013 newscast, al-Qaradawi stated, “The leader of the
party of Satan [Hezbollah] comes to fight the Sunnis...Now we know what the Iranians
want…continued massacres to kill Sunnis.” This kind of discourse further constituted the Syrian
conflict along sectarian divides, and thus also re-constituted the Syrian identity itself along these
same lines by defining the people by their Alawi or Sunni identity.
Systemically, it is now apparent that regional conflicts have found their battlefield in
Syria. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have all supported various Islamist groups in Syria,
groups which have very clearly espoused sectarian sentiments.218 In 2013, Saudi Arabia
approved the formation of the Salafist Islamic Front, which used anti-Alawi discourse openly.
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Regular citizens in the region and around the world were able to funnel funds to different groups
and people would soon come from around the world to fight in Syria.
Nihad Nahas, a Sunni communist among the regime’s opposition who spent 15 years in
prison, said “Syrian society used to be much more liberal and more secular. It was not until after
the Alawis strong-armed Assad to power that tribes and religious groups gained importance. The
ideological rift between them has deepened.”219 This sentiment is supported by others, including
a Syrian intellectual who summed it up with the following: “In the 1950s we were communists,
Baathists, Nasserists, or Syrian nationalists. Today we are Sunnis, Alawis, Druze, or Christians
again.” The days of a unified front in Syria were gone.
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Chapter 4 – Patterns in Constructing Sectarianism
Introduction
As has been seen, sectarianism requires a nurturing environment in order to burgeon and
grow in societies. This thesis attempted to show that sectarianism is not innate in the peoples or
states of Syria and Iraq, nor is it simply innate in Islamic societies. Instead, sectarianism is
constructed through intermestic interactions within the international system, reinforced by the
ideas and interests of agent states. The burgeoning of sectarian violence in the two states must
thus be understood with a nuanced approach that assesses how historic and modern interactions
within and between states has impacted the sectarian characteristics of Iraq and Syria.
The previous chapters have provided a Constructivist analysis of the growth of
sectarianism in Iraq and Syria from the period of the League of Nations mandates until the
twenty-first century. The influence of intermestics through system and agent analyses has been
assessed to form a comprehensive understanding of today’s sectarian conflicts in the two states.
As case studies, these analyses demonstrate the individual circumstances of the states and how
sectarianism formed in each. Through a synthetic analysis, we can better understand patterns that
may allow for a more thorough understanding of the dangers that sectarianism poses to similar
states. What can we derive from the two cases? What patterns can be identified from the
previous analyses that can bring clarity to the complexity of today’s sectarian civil wars?
This chapter will aim to tease out key patterns of sectarian construction that appear within
both the Syrian and Iraqi cases within this thesis. Each case’s unique elements have already been
extensively assessed through the case-study chapters. However, in order to truly understand the
prevalent confusion of our current time, we need to better understand the patterns that have
allowed sectarianism to flourish. Through Wendt’s Constructivist agenda, which has already
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been expanded upon in the first chapter, this concluding chapter will highlight and analyze
several of the key systemic and unit-level interactions that helped construct the sectarian tensions
that exploded into the civil wars in Syria and Iraq.

Structural Elements of Sectarian Construction
The structure of any social system will contain three elements: material conditions,
interests, and ideas… [They are] distinct and play different roles in explanation. The
significance of material conditions is constituted in part by interest, but they are not the
same thing…. Similarly, interests are constituted in part by ideas, but they are not the
same thing… without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no
meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all….
The task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system
fit together into some kind of whole.”220
The synthesis analysis begins by examining the systemic elements that have shaped
sectarianism in Syria and Iraq, beginning with the mandate period which was an area of focus for
both case studies. Wendt gives us the key to understanding the systemic component. We must
assess three elements: the material conditions, interests and ideas. The interaction between these
creates the system as a whole. We thus begin with the base of the interests and material
conditions – ideas.
Orientalist Foundations of Sectarianism
Western rule over Syria and Iraq in the early twentieth century has had irreversible
consequences on the region, especially in shaping sectarian conflicts. President Woodrow
Wilson brought forth the Westphalian system of states upon non-European peoples in the
nineteen twenties.221 The new order would be based on “universal” principles of the sovereign
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state which would aim to foster open world markets and politically independent states. However,
independence did not come simply through the empowerment of the peoples. Mandates were
created under the authority of various Western powers which would rule over Oriental lands. As
we have seen, the power of the mandates built sectarian foundations in the societies of both Syria
and Iraq.
What allowed for the rule of Western powers in the two states? Materially, the League of
Nations was the institution that legitimized the mandates of Iraq and Syria under the British and
French respectively. However, this material condition cannot exist without both interests and
ideas, as was elaborated on by Wendt. I argue that the powerful systemic culture of Orientalism
allowed for the legitimization of the rule of the French and British on Syrian and Iraqi society.
What were the ideas behind the mandates? In 1907, Gertrude Bell wrote “The Oriental is
like a very old child… He is not practical in our acceptance of the word, any more than a child is
practical, and his utility is not ours.”222 Later, she also wrote that “Arabs are too fickle, weak and
uncivilized.” In an article in The Baghdad Times announcing the new mandate in Iraq – or
Mesopotamia as it was then called – on May 3, 1920, a similar sentiment is prevalent:
It is the duty of the mandate power to act the part of a wise and far-seeing guardian who
makes provision for the training of his charge with a view to fitting him to take his place
in the world of men. Mesopotamia has suffered under centuries of misrule during which
the versatility of her people and the productivity of her lands have been checked, or
stayed... And as the guardian rejoices over the growth of his ward into sane and
independent manhood, so will the guardian, Power [sic] see with satisfaction the
development of political institutions which shall be sound and free.223
The above shows several of the key elements that influenced British and French thinking
during the mandate period. The article notes that the peoples have “suffered under centuries of
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misrule during which the versatility of her [Mesopotamia’s] people and the productivity of her
lands have been checked, or stayed.” This powerful notion of the static nature of Ottoman rule
impacted the way in which the French and British saw their mandates. The British assumed that
those educated under the Ottomans were backward and not capable of possessing power and thus
placed their hopes on the authority and rule of tribal sheikhs. The French, believing the millet
system of the Ottomans to have sustained the complete separation of different religious groups,
implemented policies that actually aggravated divisions between different religious groups by
viewing them as completely detached from one another.
This type of discourse can be juxtaposed with the critical sentiments of the peoples,
which refuted this notion. In a speech by the Acting Civil Commissioner to Arab Deputation in
Baghdad in June of 1920, the Commissioner gave an empowered proclamation that dismantled
Orientalist claims. The Orient was not what the British envisioned and he called for the people to
stand up, noting demonstrations across the region, including in Syria.
Lloyd George declared to the House of Commons that Mesopotamia should have a Wasi
(mandatory) to have charge of the country for its progress etc. but do you know what is
meant by a mandate? They are unable to look after themselves or to behave themselves.
Did Lloyd George forget that under Turkish rule, Turkey was a Government which
depended on Arab officials who were the means of its success… Mesopotamians get up;
demand your rights, demand your complete independence, confirm the demands of your
representatives; Wake up from your sleep; the result of sleep will be disastrous.224
Opposing the Western perspective, here we get a different interpretation of Ottoman rule.
The Commissioner specifically notes that “Turkey was a Government which depended on Arab
officials who were the means of success.” The speech thus contradicts the notion of the
backward, static Orient which had not seen progress during the era of the Ottoman Empire. It
also dismantles the notion that the Orient needs a guardian to take care of it.
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Even when states gained independence, Orientalist discourse and thought continued. In a
testimony by the High Commissioner Sir Francis Humphry to argue for the independence of
Iraq, he argues that there are two types of states, the “civilized nations of the modern world” and
others like Iraq that “may not run quite so smoothly or so efficiently as in some more advanced
and highly developed State.”225 In line with Orientalist tradition, the Commissioner views
Western powers as civilized while Iraq, and other former Ottoman territories, are contrasted with
this vision and viewed as inefficient and implicitly uncivilized.
These powerful notions of the child-like Orient, the uncivilized Arab, led to the
demarcation of various Arab and Oriental lands to Western powers. The League of Nations was
the platform through which Orientalist ideas were implemented and set forth. Since Arabs were
“uncivilized,” they needed the support and guidance of the British and the French. It was the
manifestation of what was known as the “White Man’s Burden” from a famous British poem by
Rudyard Kipling:
Take up the White Man's burden-Send forth the best ye breed-Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need226
The powerful imagery, written in 1899, was just as influential during the mandate period
and afterwards. “Serve your captives’ need” rings with the same sentiment as Bell in her essay
about the “The Oriental” which is “like a very old child.”227 It is also the same notion as The
Baghdad Times article which calls for the guardianship of the Orient.

225

Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 40.

226

Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden." McClure's Magazine, February 12, 1899.

227

Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 15.
98

The outcome of these powerful Orientalist ideas during the mandate period of both Iraq
and Syria, by the British and French, led to the creation of policies based on such Orientalist
thought. Believing in the Ottoman Empire’s backwardness, the British formed an entirely new
system based on tribal and religious affiliations.228 The French mandate in Syria similarly
focused on religious divisions to organize society and strengthened the former Ottoman Empire
millet system, which had evolved over the years by decreasing legal distinctions between
different religious millets.229 The French thus built a system based on religious sects that allowed
religious minorities to prosper at the expense of the predominantly Sunni Muslim population.
This kind of discourse is not simply reserved for the early twentieth century; Orientalist
discourse has continued to play a key role in the constitution of the East by the West. When
declaring the invasion of Iraq in 2003, former President George Bush addressed the people in a
similar tone to the previously mentioned texts. "My fellow citizens. At this hour, American and
coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and
to defend the world from grave danger.”230 One can almost hear the echoes of “take up the White
Man’s burden” with Bush’s declaration that the Western superpower would “free its [Iraq’s]
people.” The Western savior had once again come to defend the Oriental “old child” that lacked
the capacity to care for itself. This same pattern that had been seen in the early twentieth century
was experienced by the Iraqis once again after the invasion in Iraq in 2003, when the occupying
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force built a new governing council that gave a proportional share of seats based on the ratio of
communal identities.231
A distinction in the Iraqi 2003 case, however, should be noted. The legitimacy brought
forth by the League of Nations in the 1920s was no longer the same. The United Nations, which
essentially replaced the role of the League of Nations, didn’t approve of the American invasion
of Iraq, though no party took measures to actually stop the intervention. However, the UN did
put out a resolution that legitimized the US invasion. The UN Security Resolution 1483 states
that “The Security council… welcoming [sic] the commitment of all parties concerned to support
the creation of an environment in which they [the Iraqi people] may do so [determine their own
political future] as soon as possible.” It also goes on with the resolve “that the United Nations
should play a vital role in… the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of
national and local institutions for representative governance.”232 The language makes it clear that
power must be restored to the Iraqi people, however, one cannot help but see the similarity
between this and the goal of the mandates, which were to allow for the eventual sovereignty of
the people within the mandated territories. The Orientalist culture of the international system still
seems present, though it has perhaps evolved into a more cautious discourse.
Thus, in order to understand the sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Syria, one cannot
underestimate the power of Orientalism and its resulting material manifestations. The early
concepts of the Iraqi and Syrian states were formed by the West, which was given power by the
League of Nations to form new states after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The concept of the
backward Orient pushed forth policies that halted any progress made during the Ottoman period.
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In Syria, the French reversed the progress made in the millet system that allowed for greater
equality between religious groups by more strictly adhering to the separate rule of various
religious communities, despite popular opinion. In Iraq, the British marginalized the educated
class brought up under the Ottomans, believing them to be corrupted by the former empire. Even
in modern Iraq, similar notions of the Western civilizer and savior have allowed for the
reconstruction of the Iraqi state along religious and ethnic divisions that aggravated sectarian
tensions. Powerful Orientalist ideas and discourse allowed for these real material outcomes to
burgeon in Iraq and Syria, and ultimately created the foundations of sectarianism with the very
foundations of the new states.
The centrality of Orientalism and its ability to shape states through its powerful ideas and
concepts is thus an important consideration for the future identities of these – and other regional
– states. Given the prominent role of the United States and other Western powers in the
formation of a new order in Iraq – and potentially eventually in Syria whenever the currents
steady – it is important to recognize the role Orientalism will play. Will Orientalism continue to
shape interests and perceptions of the international community around false or romantic notions,
leading to material policies that will continue to perpetuate sectarianism? Or will the system
recognize the complex nature of the peoples of the region and allow for a more natural order to
take place? Only time will tell but the restraint of the United Nations in condoning new
interventions outright, as in the case with Iraq in 2003 and later in the case of Syria since its civil
war – indicates that perhaps Orientalist notions have dimmed.
The Iranian Revolution & Regional Identity
The Iranian Revolution and its impact on the region is another important systemic factor
that reinforced sectarian construction. Important moments which perpetuated sectarianism in
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both the cases of Syria and Iraq can be situated in the midst of a conflict over the regional
identity of Middle Eastern countries. The tensions that arose as a result of the Iranian Revolution
were systemically at play in perpetuating sectarianism, especially in the period immediately
following the Revolution. New fears arose over potential upheavals that would destabilize the
status quo, given Iran’s stance against regional powers. Revolutionary Iranian discourse depicted
the Sunni governments as tyrannical and illegitimate and thus brought forth a new conflict over
regional identity.233
Iraq reacted defensively at the outset of the Iranian Revolution. After the Iranian
Revolution, Iraq executed Shia leader Baqer al-Sadr and deported Iraqis who were accused of
harboring sentiments for Iran; the regime accused deportees of being “Iranian Iraqis.”234 This
very explicit reaction shows the degree to which revolutionary momentum of the Iranian
Revolution was felt in Iraq, which took defensive steps to quell any potential dissident
movements inspired by the revolutionary fervor. Furthermore, Iraq took real steps to contain the
threat posed by Iran by invading the country in 1980 and also by supporting exiled Iranians from
the opposition. The 1991 revolt in Iraq and subsequent extreme reaction of the regime in
repressing the movement can thus be seen through this prism, as part of a larger threat posed by
neighboring Iran.
Like the Saddam regime, the Hafiz regime battled its own internal dissent groups at
home, which can also be understood as part of this greater systemic rebellious movement that
gained momentum through the Iranian Revolution. Within this environment of general rebellion,
the attempted assassination on Hafiz took place, followed by the unprecedented crackdown on
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Hama in 1982 due to regional fears of instability. Unlike Saddam, Assad was supportive of the
new Iranian regime and thus had to also face regional backlash for this support. While the Hafiz
regime was at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood domestically, the Jordanians and Egyptians
added to the sectarian fire by fueling the concept of the “dirty Alawis.”235 In a speech by former
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat:
Let these dirty Alawis speak for it. These are people who have lost all life’s meaning. By
God, let them face their people in Syria, because the Syrian people are powerless in this the attitude of the Alawi is known… [King] Faysal [of Saudi Arabia] told me that Hafiz
al-Assad is Alawi and Baathist, and the one is more evil than the other… Faysal also told
me: How can you hold hands with the Syrian Baathists? Al-Assad is an Alawi and
Baathist; one is more evil than the other.
In the context of the greater conflict between the Shia threat posed by Iran, which was
supported by Syria, this behavior can be understood. The harsh language used by the Egyptian
President is part of the greater regional battle for the identity of the region as Sunni Arab. The
Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, stood by the Egyptians and
Jordanians in their aim to contain general rebellions as well as protect the Sunni identity of the
region.236 Looking at the two camps, one notes the obvious religious divide. The ruling parties in
the Gulf, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan are all Sunni while Syria had no issue siding with the Shia Iran
due to its own ruling-party identity. Thus, one can also view the increased sectarian tensions in
Iraq and Syria through the two states’ position within a regional conflict over the identity of the
Middle East.
The role of the regional system as a whole is thus an important consideration in
understanding the potential for sectarian tensions to ignite. Regional movements allow groups
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with historical grievances – such as sectarian religious groups – to place themselves within a
larger frame. This was later seen during the Arab Spring, which saw the uprisings of Syria after
similar protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia and across the Middle East. The ways in which
regional powers dealt with and continue to deal with protests that continue to echo from the
memory of the Arab Spring will play an important role in whether or not sectarian religious
tensions will be further intensified.

Agent & Agent-Interaction Elements of Sectarian Construction
The above laid the foundation for understanding the systemic patterns that supported the
construction of sectarianism in Iraq and Syria, but to continue with the intermestic approach,
attention also needs to be given to agent and agent-interaction elements, which are equally
important in this analysis. The agents are the actors that react to the systemic environment,
without which one cannot have a nuanced understanding of sectarianism. We now assess the
agent elements which supported in the construction of sectarianism in Syria and Iraq. Three
patterns are noted here: the insecurity of minority rule, the extreme sectarian reactions by
regimes and the burgeoning religious discourse and maneuvers by the regimes.
Insecurity of Minority Rule
One of the main agent-patterns of the two cases is the religious-minority status of the
ruling regime. The Baathist regimes in both countries espoused a secular ideology that could
have absorbed political movements from all kinds of backgrounds, including Islamists,
moderates and others. However, there was a prevalent insecurity of both regimes due to their
ruling party’s overwhelmingly religious-minority leaders. This led to the interpretation of protest
movements as overtly sectarian, against minority rule. Were these sentiments founded on reality?
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Both regimes were dominated by the leaders’ religious kin. As has been noted earlier in
Chapter 2, Saddam favored his own family members and the Tikriti tribe over others – most of
whom were Sunni, despite the fact that the majority of the country was Shia.237 Both Hafiz alAssad and Bashar al-Assad’s regimes placed Alawi’s within the main political power
structures.238 Previous analysis has shown attempts by both parties to co-opt the majority
population which felt disenfranchised to varying degrees. However, the very nature of the rule of
the minority at the expense of the majority is something that clearly had an effect on the
constitution of sectarian identities. The regimes’ apparent insecurity – as will be shown shortly
by an analysis of their reactions to rebellions – supported in framing any rebellion as part of an
“us” versus “them.” This dichotomy was defined by religious identities. This idea of the fear of a
possible uprising by the majority religious sectarian group affected the interests of the regimes in
suppressing any political opposition and whole religious groups as opposed to dissents only.
Extreme Sectarian Reactions by Regimes
When rebellions arose in both cases, the dictatorial rulers revealed their insecurities and
simultaneously constituted the state’s sectarianism identity. The suppression after major
rebellions in both Iraq and Syria were not only brutal but also produced clear sectarian reactions.
This allowed for the burgeoning of sectarian sentiments in Iraq and Syria.
In Iraq after the failed invasion of Kuwait, protesters took to the streets in all nine of the
Shia-dominant governorates.239 The apparent sectarian nature of the rebellion dissuaded Sunnis
from joining. Instead of only reacting to the protesters, the regime took on a new sectarian slogan
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- “There will be no Shia after today.”240 The regime took unprecedented steps to put Shia clerics
under house arrest and destroy Shia religious shrines.
The Iraqi regime had the choice to view the 1991 rebellion as an isolated event. Instead, it
perceived the threat along sectarian lines and took measures accordingly. Because of the looming
system threat posed by the Iranian Revolution and the regime’s own insecurity over its identity
as part of the minority religious group, the rebellion became an important point of contention that
would further mar Iraqi relations internally. The regime thus fueled sectarian discourse that
further exacerbated sectarian divisions by perceiving the rebellion through this prism, instead of
viewing the threat as only a political one or one limited to certain individuals as opposed to an
entire religious sect. At the same time, the Sunnis who didn’t join the protests also allowed for
this kind of discourse by delegitimizing the rebellion as a result of its supposedly Shia nature.
The people and the regime thus constituted the conflict along sectarian lines.
Similarly, in Syria after an attempted assassination of Hafiz al-Assad, the regime
executed a massacre of unprecedented levels in the country.241 The units led by President
Assad’s brother Rif’at killed an entire prison full of Muslim Brotherhood members as they sat in
their cells. The height of the showdown occurred in the city of Hama when ten percent of its
predominantly Sunnis population was decimated by an Alawi Baath unit, killing anywhere from
an estimated 5000 to 25000 victims.242 Hafiz’s actions were perhaps less overtly sectarian as he
did not justify the massacre along religious lines, but the reaction was just as extreme. Attacking
the Muslim Brotherhood just prior to the massacre, Assad had stated “May God curse them and
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their Islam. We shall not have one Islam with them. They are murderers of Islam and
Muslims.”243 While not pointing to the type of Islam and perhaps attempting to simply push the
Brotherhood out of the Islamic tradition, Assad is still using religious terms and bringing
salience to religious identities. The extreme reaction in the Hama Massacre, situated in the
general sentiment of Alawi domination and the use of religious discourse, easily allowed for a
sectarian interpretation of the catastrophic event.
These extreme reactions against the opposition reveal several things about the regimes.
First, as has been noted, the regimes were highly insecure. As they couldn’t be certain of who
was in the opposition and who was supportive, they chose to target an entire population based on
what appeared to be religious faith. Why would this be the reaction? The regimes’ own sense of
identity as part of a religious minority appears to have played an important role. Targeting an
entire religious population shows the “us” versus “them” mentality within the regimes as a result
of internal fears about the regimes’ minority identity within the country. Their reactions reconstituted the sectarian identities within the states by pitting two groups opposite each other.
Burgeoning Religious Discourse and Maneuvers
Prior to the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, religious discourse and religious institutions
burgeoned, while other forms of civil and political organizations suffered. This is integral to our
understanding of the growth of sectarianism as parallel to the general decline of most forms of
political organization was a greater presence of religious discourse within states, which allowed
for an increased sense of religious identity. In the years preceding civil unrest, both regimes had
played a dangerous game by evoking religion and allowing extremism to grow unabated.
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In Iraq’s case, the UN sanctions in the 1990s and Saddam’s war against Iran pushed forth
a new sectarian discourse in the country, as has been assessed. The regime allowed tribes to
flourish, in place of its own incompetence in supporting the people due to sanctions.244 Its
support for Sunni tribes allowed for sectarian sentiments to burgeon. Due to the religious tones
of the Iranians which threatened Saddam’s rule, the regime framed the conflict around similar
religious notions. On the one hand, Khomeini fueled sectarianism with declarations such as,
“You are fighting to protect Islam, and [Saddam] is fighting to destroy Islam.” 245 Saddam
similarly positioned himself in religious terms as a mujahid. State-supported religious discourse
grew to new heights, allowing for sectarian religious identities to burgeon and grow. The explicit
“Faith Campaign,” with its Sunni-basis, supported the growth of religious sentiments by
encouraging stricter adherence to Islamic principles. The person to mosque ratio rose
substantially from 1:37,000 in the 1950s to 1:3,500 in the 1990s. And the media attacked Shia
religious rituals and traditions. As has been previously noted, Jerry Long’s analysis shows a
significant escalation of the Iraqi state’s religious discourse from the sixties to the nineties. 246
Such maneuvers may have seemed tactically sound at the time, by attempting to counteract the
catastrophic results of UN sanctions and retaliating to the Iranian religious discourse, but the
long-term consequences proved disastrous as radically conservative forms of religious discourse
grew and a greater sense of sectarian identity proliferated.
In the twenty-first century the Assad regime in Syria had a similar experience. As has
been analyzed, Assad pushed secularists to the fringes of society while he toyed with
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conservative religious movements. The Bashar regime extended an olive branch to the Muslim
Brotherhood, to reconcile what had happened in the Hama Massacre of eighty-two.247 Secularists
that criticized radically conservative Islamic movements, like Nabil Fayyad, were put to jail.
While the regime made it impossible for civil society to grow by banning meetings of five or
more people, Islamists found a safe haven in Quranic schools and mosques. As political scientist
Salam Kawkibi stated, “Nowadays there are hundreds of mosques in Damascus but not a single
meeting hall for secular people. This says everything.”248 And according to philosopher Tayyeb
Tizini, “The regime has sometimes actively supported the Islamists because they wanted to keep
them as a visible danger to the secular opposition: ‘Just look, this is the danger. Either you have
us or you get them.’” The regime’s encouragement of the resistance in Iraq, as part of its
strategic opposition to the U.S., allowed for religious fanatics to funnel through Syria in order to
fight in Iraq. In the end, the regime got more than it had bargained for by pursuing policies that
suppressed all but religiously-motivated organizations.
Thus, prior to their respective civil wars, both states escalated religious tensions through
greater religiously provocative discourse and actions. Such maneuvers allowed for the
construction of conflicts around religious lines, which brought greater salience to religious
identities. Both regimes had attempted to use religion in their favor. Saddam tried to combat
Iran’s religiously fueled attacks with his own. Bashar attempted to dissuade rebels and
oppositionists by allowing a more conservative threat to rise. In the end, the tactical maneuvers
by the regimes did nothing to protect the status-quo and allowed for an eventual explosion of
sectarian tensions supported by religious fervor.
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Conclusion
Thus, we can see that the construction of sectarianism is a complex process that requires
both a nurturing systemic environment as well as agent support in building such tensions. One
cannot sum up the conflicts in Syria and Iraq as a result of ancient primordial hatreds or, as U.S.
President Barack Obama once stated in 2013, that “in that part of the world, there are ancient
sectarian differences.”249 That is an overly simplistic and reductionist comment that takes away
from a nuanced understanding of the historic and modern ideas, interests and material structures
that have cultivated sectarianism through the system and agents. Furthermore, this thesis aimed
to highlight the importance of including analyses of the complexities of intermestics in
international relations in order to form a nuanced understanding of international issues and
topics, including sectarianism.
This thesis aimed to give a comprehensive analysis of the construction of sectarianism in
two of the world’s most intriguing civil conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Through this research, we
have assessed case-by-case analyses of the construction of sectarianism in Iraq and Syria from
the early twentieth century when the Syrian and Iraqi states were first formed under Western
mandates up until the modern period in the twenty-first century at the outbreak of war. This
thesis has brought to light the common structural and agent-level elements that allowed for the
burgeoning of sectarian identities within the states. I have highlighted the centrality of Orientalist
ideas in conceiving the earliest visions of the Syrian and Iraqi states, which have had an
irreversible impact on both cases, allowing for a historical sense of victimhood among certain
religiously-defined sectarian groups in both countries. This thesis has also analyzed the impact of
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the Iranian Revolution in creating a regional identity conflict which reinforced sectarian
discourse and produced sectarian reactions. Three agent-level patterns have been highlighted to
better understand the growth of sectarianism, including the insecurity of minority rule, extreme
sectarian reactions by regimes under attack by certain opposition groups and the general growth
of religious discourse and actions in the two countries as well as the region prior to the outbreak
of the civil wars.
This thesis has brought forth a nuanced analysis of modern events. Short-term analyses
that only look at modern occurrences become overly simplistic and ignore the important impact
of historic sentiments of victimhood and conflicts that fuel sectarianism. Thus, this thesis has
brought forth a historic analysis of a period of approximately a century. Looking through the
Constructivist lens has allowed for a more complete understanding of sectarianism by focusing
on not only material outcomes but also on ideas and interests. I have aimed to assess the
construction of sectarianism through an equal focus on structural and agent elements,
operationalized by an intermestic approach.
This thesis provides not only an analysis of these two cases but also brings forth new
questions. If the Iranian Revolution had such long-term consequences on sectarianism, what
impact will the Arab Spring have on the region? The first victim of the Arab Spring, Syria, has
fallen. Libya is in a similarly precarious position. What of the remaining neighboring countries?
The Gulf countries have similarly large diversity among their religious sects and strong divisions
between Shias and Sunnis. Their reactions to protest movements have been as brutal as those of
Hafiz al-Assad in the 1982 Hama Massacre and Saddam in the 1990s.250 Will regional powers
learn the dangers of such explicit sectarian reactions to demonstrations? In the case of Bahrain, a
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minority rules, as in the cases of Iraq and Syria, with a Shia majority population ruled by a Sunni
head.251 How will intermestics play out in other regional players? The two case studies from this
thesis exemplify the importance of including an analysis of intermestics in future research.
One can note almost all of the patterns pointed to in this chapter as still characteristic of
many of the Middle East’s regional powers. Orientalist discourse remains on the larger systemic
scale, as the UN and other international groups continue to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs.
The threat posed by the Iranian Revolution remains a prominent issue among Middle Eastern
countries with large Shia populations, like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Minority rule plagues
countries like Bahrain and the “other-ing” of certain religious groups threatens even states with
majority rule. Burgeoning religious discourse is at an all-time high with the threat of Daesh.
Furthermore, Middle Eastern states continue to react to demonstrations with extreme state
repression that may bolster a sense of sectarian victimhood across the region and allow for the
fueling of sectarian conflict.
Understanding how sectarianism is constructed is essential to learning from the mistakes
of the past. This thesis aimed to put forth a Constructivist analysis of sectarianism in Syria and
Iraq, followed by a synthetic analysis of important patterns that contributed to the eruption of
sectarian violence in both cases. Structurally, Orientalism in the international system and the
identity threat of the Iranian Revolution allowed for the burgeoning of sectarian discourse and
reactions. On the agent-level, the minority rule of both states and the extreme sectarian reactions
of states against dissidents supported the construction of a sectarian sense of victimhood.
Furthermore, a general increase in religious discourse in Iraq and Syria, as well as in the region,
brought greater salience to religious sectarian identities which would later erupt into sectarian
251

“Bahrain country profile,” last modified November 24, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-14540571.
112

civil war. One not only wonders about the future of these states, but also about neighboring
countries and their potential to follow in these dangerous footsteps. Will states learn from the
mistakes of the past and take heed of the dangers of fueling sectarian fire, or, given just the
wrong circumstances, will we witness more sectarian violence in the region?
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